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Abstract
We study the welfare costs of business cycles in a search and matching model with
financial frictions à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). We investigate the mechanisms that
allow the model to replicate the volatility on labor and financial markets and show
that business cycle costs are sizable. We first demonstrate that the interactions be-
tween labor market and financial frictions magnify the impact of shocks via (i) a credit
multiplier effect and (ii) an endogenous wage rigidity inherent to financial frictions.
Secondly, in a non-linear framework, we show that the large welfare costs of fluctu-
ations are also explained by the high average unemployment and the low job finding
rates with respect to their deterministic steady-state values.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the welfare costs of fluctuations in an original framework that fea-
tures strong interactions between financial and labor market frictions. A glance at the data
suggests the empirical relevance of this interaction. Figure 1 shows that episodes of job
creation (when the job-finding rate Ψ rises) are also times when firms accumulate debt.1
Figure 1: Cyclicality of unemployment rate U , job finding rate Ψ and debt stock B.
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HP Filtered logged quarterly data. Shaded area shows recessions (NBER dates). HP filtered data on U
and Ψ were divided by 4 for the purpose of scale consistency. Smoothing parameter: 1600. Source : See
Appendix A.
We argue that the strong interactions between financial and labor frictions can potentially
lead to sizeable welfare costs of business cycles. This results does not only come from the
rise of aggregate volatility, but also from the increase in the gaps of unemployment and job
finding rates with respect to their deterministic steady-state values. Indeed, if unemploy-
ment increases during recessions outweigh falls in unemployment during economic booms,
average unemployment (hence average consumption) lies above (lies below) its steady-state
counterpart, such that welfare costs of fluctuations becomes sizeable. Obviously, a satisfac-
tory assessment of welfare costs of the business cycle must rely on (i) a model that replicates
the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates (quantities and prices) and (ii) a quantitative
approach that accounts for model non-linearities so as to distinguish the averages from the
steady-state values of macroeconomic aggregates. This paper analyzes these points using a
Diamond (1982)–Mortensen (1982)–Pissarides (1985) (hereafter DMP) model in which en-
1Jermann & Quadrini (2012) also notice that debt repurchases (a reduction in outstanding debt) increase
during or around recessions.
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trepreneurs’ access to credit is limited by a collateral constraint as in Kiyotaki & Moore
(1997), because of enforcement limits. Agents are characterized by heterogeneous discount
rates: impatient financially-constrained entrepreneurs borrow from patient (saver) house-
holds. Entrepreneurs borrow so as to finance intra-period hiring costs. This gives rise to
an interaction between labor market and financial frictions. Moreover, because of Kiyotaki
& Moore (1997)’s setting, the wage-bargaining process is characterized by original features
that entail labor-market fluctuations to match the business cycle.
Beyond the usual "financial accelerator" effect inherent to DSGE models with financial
frictions2, we show that the interactions between financial and labor frictions generate en-
dogenous real wage rigidity that magnifies in turn the impact of shocks. This allows us to
solve the Shimer (2005) volatility puzzle. The intuition is the following. In booms, the cost
of credit falls so that firms enjoy a lower cost of hiring and open more vacancies. This is the
so-called "credit multiplier" found in the literature.3 4 The opening of new vacancies also
increases the average duration to fill a vacancy (due to congestion effects). This raises the
quantity of credit the firm needs to borrow, which is proportional to the duration to fill a
vacancy. Notice that in our model the share of the match surplus used to finance credit costs
is perceived to be lower by the (impatient) entrepreneur than by the (patient) worker. This
is a key element to make the entrepreneur reluctant to accept wage increases in booms. We
show that this counter-cyclical component in the wage setting rule is the channel through
which our model can generate endogenous wage rigidity. Rigid wages are consistent with
the data and entail in turn large fluctuations in labor-market aggregates that match the
empirical volatility.5
From a normative point of view, we investigate the non-linear mechanisms by which economic
losses in recessions are larger than gains from booms. We first derive analytical results based
on a simplified version of the model. The DMP model is per se potentially able to predict
unemployment increases in recessions that are larger than unemployment falls in booms.
This explains why in our model average unemployment is higher than its deterministic
counterpart throughout the cycle. Indeed, the Beveridge curve implies that unemployment
2See Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010) for a survey.
3See Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) among others.
4Notice that there is only a technological shock in our model. This restrictive view of the sources of
fluctuations has a double advantage: first, it allows us to isolate the mechanism at work in the model;
second, it facilitates the comparisons of our framework with the other contributions on the Shimer (2005)
puzzle. We include financial shocks as a robustness check in section 5.4.
5This wage rule is thus more relevant with respect to the introduction of rigid wages. Wage volatility
in US data is 60% that of output. As Chéron & Langot (2004) and Pissarides (2009) that echo the old
Keynes-Tarshis-Dunlop controversy, we stress the need to understand fluctuations in both unemployment
and wages.
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is a convex function of the job finding rate. Thus, fluctuations in the job finding rate push
the average rate of unemployment above its deterministic steady-state value. Notice that
this feature is shared by all DMP models.6 The large size of fluctuations in the job finding
rate7 is not sufficient to generate our results. Indeed, the gap between the average job finding
rate and its deterministic steady-state value is also crucial for the evaluation of welfare costs
of business cycle. We show that two opposite forces are at work.
First, one force dampens welfare costs because hiring decisions are a convex function of ag-
gregate productivity. This leads the standard stochastic DMP model to generate a higher
average level of labor-market tightness with respect to its deterministic counterpart, thereby
dampening the welfare costs of fluctuations. As unemployment falls during booms, hiring
takes more time so that firms create more vacancies to reach their targeted employment
level. Labor market tightness hence increases more in expansion than it declines in reces-
sion. Moreover, given that the matching function exhibits decreasing marginal returns to
vacancies, the job-creation condition is satisfied for greater variations in job creations during
booms than during recessions.
A second opposite force, which is specific to our model, magnifies welfare costs by generating
a concave relationship between hiring decision and productivity. The key element in the
model is the new component specific to financial frictions, which is incorporated into the
wage equation. In booms, large increases in labor market tightness also mean that it takes
longer to hire workers. As firms use loans to pay for hiring costs, in booms, credit costs
increase. This is taken into account in the bargained wage because impatient entrepreneurs
perceive less future profits with respect to patient workers. Given that credit costs increase
in booms, they significantly moderate wages hikes in expansion. As credit costs increase
more in booms than it declines in recession, smaller variations in labor-market tightness are
needed in booms than in recessions to satisfy the job creation condition. This mechanism can
lead labor-market tightness to be a concave function of productivity and thus widens the gap
between average and deterministic steady-state values of unemployment. We demonstrate
that because of financial frictions à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) and their effect on the Nash
bargaining, the model entails large welfare costs of business cycles.8
6See Yashiv (2007) for a survey.
7See the above discussion on the Shimer (2005)’s puzzle.
8One might be surprised that, in a model with financial frictions, credit costs expand in booms. We are
referring here to the duration of credit, captured by the average time needed to fill a vacancy. The "credit
multiplier" effect, that improves firms’ access to credit in booms, is nonetheless at work in the model. We
also show that financial frictions with rigid wages can even lead to welfare gains from fluctuations. Hence,
wage adjustments in the Nash-bargaining rule play a crucial role in the understanding of sizeable welfare
costs of cycles.
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We build a calibrated DSGE model incorporating these features. We find that the introduc-
tion of financial frictions make the relative volatility of the job-finding rate twice as large
with respect to what we obtain with a DSGE model with labor-market frictions only. By
dampening wage increases, financial imperfections allow firms to preserve their incentive to
open new vacancies in booms. This mechanism helps the model solve Shimer (2005)’s puz-
zle so that our unemployment and job finding rates are respectively 5.5 and 6 times more
volatile than output and wage volatility is close to the data.9 The model also correctly
predicts the volatility on financial markets. As land supply does not vary over the business
cycle, any change in land demand results in changes in the real-estate price. The model
is then able to generate volatile collateral price (about 3 times more volatile than output).
The predicted debt volatility is also consistent with the data (about 1.5 times more volatile
than output). This is due to the interaction between financial and labor market frictions in
the borrowing constraint. Indeed, absent labor-market frictions in the borrowing constraint,
the volatility of the collateral price directly predicts the volatility of corporate debt. In this
case, the model would predict a debt volatility that is too large with respect to data. When
vacancies are incorporated into the borrowing constraint, the variance of the collateral price
equals the sum of the variance of debt, that of vacancies and the covariance between debt
and vacancies. In spite of a large volatility of the collateral price, because vacancies are very
volatile and covariate positively with debt, our model is able to match the volatility of debt.
The welfare cost of the business-cycle in a economy with financial and labor market frictions
is 2.5% of workers’ permanent consumption. It drastically falls without financial frictions
and labor market frictions only (0.12%). These costs are far larger than the estimates by
Lucas (1987, 2003), who reports a welfare cost of 0.05% in the case of logarithmic utility.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our original contribution with respect
to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 uses a simplified version of the
model to provide economic intuitions. Our quantitative analysis is developed in section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
9One could argue that wage rigidity is enough to solve the difficult exercise of obtaining a volatile labor-
market response to productivity shocks. We stress that wage rigidity cannot be a relevant solution because
wage volatility in US data is 60% that of output. Thus, wages do fluctuate throughout the business cycle.
10In order to show that this result is robust, we propose several extensions of our basic model in section
5.4
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2 Related literature
Our contribution lies in bridging the gap between two strands of the literature, the first one
studies the welfare costs of fluctuations and the second one investigates the macroeconomic
impact of financial frictions on labor market dynamics. While each element has been studied
independently, the contribution of our paper lies in combining both.
Lucas (1987, 2003) shows that welfare costs associated with business cycles are negligible. In
his framework, costs associated with recessions are indeed compensated by the gains during
booms. In this paper, we challenge Lucas’s result by proposing a non-linear DSGE model
that can generate significant asymmetries at business-cycle frequency. In our model, the costs
of recessions cannot be compensated by the gains of expansions because average employment
and average consumption are significantly lower than their deterministic steady-state levels.
Welfare costs of fluctuations can then be significantly greater than those found by Lucas.11
As explained by Hairault et al. (2010) and Jung & Kuester (2011), this is due to the fact that
the non-linearities of the DMP model introduce a gap between the deterministic steady-state
and mean unemployment levels. They show how this generates business-cycle costs ranging
between 0.2% and 1.2% of permanent consumption in their calibrated models.12. However,
these works neglect financial frictions. 13
The link between the matching model and financial imperfections is intuitive.14 Search
activity is costly for firms and needs to be financed with borrowing. However, this investment
cannot be used as a collateral. Our paper also complement the view developed by Hall
(2017): unemployment increases in periods of high discount rates. In our framework, it is
not the absolute value of the discount rate that matters but the gap between borrowers’
(entrepreneurs) and lenders’ (households) discount rates. Our general equilibrium approach
11In case of a significant gap between average and deterministic steady-state values, such costs are of a
first-order magnitude – as the costs of tax distortion also evaluated by Lucas (1987).
12Our study differs from previous works on business-cycle costs, such as Beaudry & Pages (2001), Storeslet-
ten et al. (2001) or Krebs (2003), in that it regards interactions between the labor and financial frictions as
the root of the welfare cost of business cycles.
13The asymmetries and non-linearities of labor markets have been also recently studied by Petrosky-
Nadeau & Zhang (2017) and Ferraro (2018). Moreover, in Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018) the asymmetries
charachterizing the DMP model together with cumulatively large negative shocks can explain rare events
like disasters, as measured at the aggregate level by Barro (2006). Our paper complements these studies by
analyzing the implications on welfare of the non-linearities in the DMP model.
14As suggested by Pissarides (2011), the "equilibrium matching models are built on the assumption of
perfect capital markets. ... But future work needs to explore other assumptions about capital markets, and
integrate the financial sector with the labour market. This might suggest another amplification mechanism
for shocks, independently from wage stickiness or fixed costs" (Pissarides (2011)). Dromel et al. (2010) show
that Pissarides (2011)’ intuition is supported by significant empirical links between unemployment dynamics
and financial frictions.
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also explains the dynamics of this gap (the financial wedge) in a framework where fluctuations
are driven by a technological shock.15
Recent research has studied how evolving conditions on credit markets affect the dynamics
of labor markets. Many of them specifically focus on how to improve the ability of standard
search models to match data and solve the Shimer puzzle. Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) intro-
duces financial frictions à la Bernanke et al. (1999) in a DMP model. However, in order to
match data, an ad hoc countercyclical monitoring cost is included in the financial contract.
Garin (2015) analyzes the effect of a credit shock and argues that it is critical to understand
labor market dynamics. However, he does not control for the implications on financial ag-
gregates: in response to the shock, the debt volatility generated by his model is five times
as greater as the one of output (see his Figure 3, p.122). This is counterfactual (see Table
2 in this paper). Liu et al. (2016) include housing-land holdings into the utility function so
as to generate countercyclical movements in workers’ outside options. However, their model
yields limited interactions between labor and financial frictions as labor market variables do
not enter the collateral constraint. This can lead them to overestimate the weight of the
financial shock, necessary for them to fit the data.16 In contrast to this work, Chugh (2013)
includes wage payments into the working capital (together with capital rental payments).
This model with financial frictions matches the volatility of the aggregates emphasized by
Shimer (2005). However, as in all the previous papers, Chugh (2013) does not discuss the
implications of his model with respect to real wage dynamics (the Keynes-Tarshis-Dunlop
controversy). This is done in our work.
We contribute to this literature by using a streamlined model à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997).
We show that the interaction between financial and credit frictions does not systematically
generate a strong propagation mechanism. We underline why in our framework financial
frictions generate an amplification effect, which depends both on a credit-multiplier and a
new amplification mechanism. Our original mechanism affects the wage-bargaining process
and is specific to financial frictions à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). Our quantitative results
suggest that these mechanisms are sufficient to solve the volatility puzzle of the DMP model.
15We depart from the DMP models with borrowing constraints à la Aiyagari (1994). Indeed, Krusell
et al. (2010) shows that the averages of the aggregates generated by an economy where utility is linear are
"remarkably similar" to those of their model with incomplete-markets and log utility (See table 5, p.1492,
of the Krusell et al. (2010) paper). Given that the gap between average values and their deterministic
steady-state counterparts are very close in an economy with linear utility and flexible wages (See Hairault
et al. (2010)), we deduce that financial constraints à la Aiyagari (1994) do not generate welfare costs of the
business cycle. In contrast, we show that the type of financial frictions we introduce, significantly increase
the gap between the averages and the steady-state values of the aggregates, generating significant welfare
costs of the business cycle.
16Moreover, they do not analyze the volatilities of quantities and prices as their estimation includes the
real land price, but not corporate debt.
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Therefore, it is not necessary to combine exogenous fluctuations in collateral requirements
with financial constraints à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) to close the gap between the model
and the data, as suggested by Liu et al. (2016) or Garin (2015).17 We do not introduce a
banking sector à la Gertler & Kiyotaki (2010)) in a DMP model, as done by Millard et al.
(2017). In our paper, Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)’s setting introduces an heterogeneity in
discount rates into the wage bargaining, which allows us to derive an explicit interaction
between financial and labor frictions.
3 The model
The economy is populated by two types of agents: firms and workers. The representative
firm produces the final consumption good of the economy by combining labor and infras-
tructure (i.e., land). Firms can finance their activity with loans funded by households. As
debt contracts are not complete because of enforcement limits à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997),
firms are subject to a collateral constraint. Households include both unemployed individuals
and workers employed by the firms. A canonical matching process à la Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides allows firms to hire workers. Wages are set according to a standard Nash bargain-
ing process. In order to stress the economic mechanisms at work, we present a streamlined
model without capital accumulation: even without capital, households can save by lending
to firms. 18 We lay stress on the extensive margin of labor, thereby discarding adjustments
in hours, as in Blanchard & Gali (2010). Finally, we consider only technological shocks to
allow for a comparison between welfare costs in the model and the literature.
3.1 Labor market flows
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households, normalized to one.
Each household consists of a continuum of infinitely living agents. We consider a standard
labor and matching model à la DMP. Employment Nt evolves according to
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 +Mt (1)
where s denotes the separation rate. Mt, the number of hirings per period, is determined
by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function Mt = χV ψt S
1−ψ
t , with 0 < ψ < 1, χ > 0
17We also depart from Garin (2015) as we do not introduce fixed training costs and time-varying vacancy,
that are known to change per se the prediction of the basic DMP model (even without financial constraints).
18We present in section 5.4 an extension with capital.
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a scale parameter measuring the efficiency of the matching function, and Vt the number of
vacancies. Following Blanchard & Gali (2010), we suppose that a pool of jobless individuals,
St, is available for hire at the beginning of period t. This implies that the pool of jobless
agents is larger than the number of unemployed workers. Indeed, individuals are either
employed or willing to work (full participation) at all times so that St is given by
St = Ut−1 + sNt−1 = 1− (1− s)Nt−1 (2)
where Ut = 1 − Nt is the stock of unemployed workers when the size of the population
is normalized to 1 and full participation is assumed. Ut thus measures the fraction of the
population left without jobs after hiring takes place in period t. Among agents looking for
jobs at the beginning of period t, a certain number Mt is hired, and they start working in
the same period. Only workers in the unemployment pool St at the beginning of the period
can be hired (Mt ≤ St). The ratio of aggregate hires to the unemployment pool is the rate
at which jobless people in the pool find a job, Ψt ≡ Mt/St, whereas Φt ≡ Mt/Vt is the rate
at which vacancies are filled. Labor market tightness θt equals VtSt .
19
3.2 Households
Households maximize the utility function of consumption and labor. In each period, an agent
can engage in only one of two activities, working or enjoying leisure. Employment lotteries
ensure that agents are insured against the individual labor idiosyncratic risk. Hence, the
representative household’s preferences are
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
µt{NtUn (Cnt ) + (1−Nt)Uu (Cut + Γ)}
]
(3)
where 0 < µ < 1 is the discount factor and Γ the utility of leisure. Czt stands for the
consumption of employed (z = n) and unemployed agents (z = u). We assume that
U(Cnt ) =
(Cnt )
1−σ
1−σ ≡ U˜nt for employed workers and U(Cut + Γ) = (C
u
t +Γ)
1−σ
1−σ ≡ U˜ut for un-
employed workers, with σ > 0 the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The utility function
(3) has several interesting features. First, it is consistent with Rogerson (1988)’s lotteries.20
19The jobless rate is thus a convex function of the job-finding rate, S = ss+(1−s)Ψ .
20Individuals can either work or not, which creates ex-post heterogeneity across agents. The assumption
of a representative worker is made possible in this framework by using Rogerson (1988)’s lotteries because
they provide full-insurance against the risk of not-working. Indeed, there is a contract between an insurance
company and the household, which commits the household to work with probability Nt. The contract itself
has been traded on a competitive market, so the household gets paid whether it works or not. Households’
9
Secondly, as in Greenwood et al. (1988), labor supply (and thus the Nash-bargained wage)
are determined independently from intertemporal consumption-savings choices. Rather than
being a drawback, this implication of the utility function has the advantage of isolating the
effect studied here : the impact of financial frictions on wage bargaining and labor market
fluctuations.21
The budget constraint is
[NtC
n
t + (1−Nt)Cut ] +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +Ntwt + (1−Nt)bt + Tt (4)
where w denotes real wage and b unemployment benefits. T is a lump-sum transfer from
the government. Moreover, B represents private bond-financing firms and R is the gross
investment return associated with these loans. Households’ labor opportunities evolve as
follows:
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 + ΨtSt (5)
Each household chooses {Cnt , Cut , Bt} to maximize (3) subject to (4) and (5).22
3.3 Entrepreneurs and Firms
The economy includes many identical firms. Entrepreneurs maximize the following sum of
expected utilities:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
CFt
)]
(6)
where β denotes the entrepreneurs’ discount factor, and µ > β, implying that workers are
more patient than firms. Their budget constraint is
CFt +Rt−1Bt−1 + qt [Lt − Lt−1] + wtNt + ω¯Vt ≤ Yt +Bt (7)
where B is private debt, L productive land or infrastructure, and q its price. Moreover, wN
denotes total wages, with N the number of employees, whereas Y is the final output, and ω¯
the vacancy posting cost. Each firm has access to a Cobb-Douglas constant-return-to-scale
optimal decision imply that Ut(Cnt ) = U(Cut + Γ), as can be seen from household’s optimal consumption
decision (equation (27) in Appendix B.1). Since all households are ex ante identical, all will choose the same
contract. Although households are ex ante identical, they will differ ex post depending on the outcome of
the lottery: a fraction Nt, of the continuum of households will work and the rest will not.
21Hansen (1985) and Jung & Kuester (2011) use alternative utility functions so that intertemporal
consumption-savings choices affect labor decision and the Nash bargained wage. In our sensitivity anal-
ysis (section 5.4.2), we show that our results are robust with their specification.
22See Appendix B for a complete description of the model.
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production technology combining workers and infrastructure (land):
Yt = AtL
1−α
t−1 N
α
t (8)
where 0 < α < 1 and At denotes total factor productivity in the economy, assumed to
evolve stochastically as follows: logAt = ρa logAt−1 + (1 − ρa) logA + εat , with εat the iid
innovations. Firms’ activity can be financed by funds lent by households under imperfect
debt contracts. Enforcement limits à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) imply that entrepreneurs
are subject to collateral constraints. As Quadrini (2011) and Jermann & Quadrini (2012),
we assume that, at the beginning of the period, firms can access financial markets to finance
both their expenditures (i.e., consumption by entrepreneurs and land investments) as well as
the costs associated with working capital within the period. Moreover, following Petrosky-
Nadeau (2013) and Wasmer & Weil (2004), hiring costs are the working capital to finance.
Entrepreneurs can thus borrow from agents subject to the following collateral constraint 23:
Bt + ω¯Vt ≤ mEt [qt+1Lt] (9)
This constraint shows that if the entrepreneur fails to repay the loan, the lender can seize the
collateral. Given that liquidation is costly, the lender can recover up to a fraction, m, of the
value of collateral assets. m is the exogenous loan-to-debt ratio. It is possible to show that, in
presence of standard levels of uncertainty24, firms are always collateral constrained (equation
(9) holds with equality). Thus, the debt limit eventually determines the equilibrium level of
corporate debt and workers savings. Vacancies are such that
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 + ΦtVt (10)
Each entrepreneur chooses {CFt , Lt, Bt, Vt, Nt} to maximize (6) subject to (7), (9), and (10),
where Yt is given by (8). From the first order conditions on Nt and Vt, we get the Job
Creation (JC) curve is
(1 + ϕt) ω¯
Φt
=
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt + (1− s) βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
(1 + ϕt+1) ω¯
Φt+1
]
(11)
where ϕt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the credit constraint (Equation (9)) and
captures the "credit multiplier" of this model, and λFt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with the budget constraint of the entrepreneurs (Equation (7)). The credit multiplier (ϕ)
23In section 5.4, we will analyse the impact of alternative formulations of the debt limit.
24For a discussion see, among others, Iacoviello (2005). See Appendix B.2.
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appears both on the LHS and RHS of Equation (11). Nevertheless, there is almost no
persistence in the adjustment of ϕt; after a jump at the time of the shock, it comes back to its
steady-state value. We thus shift our attention to its impact on the LHS of (11). In recession,
tight credit conditions (large values of ϕt) drive up the opportunity costs associated with
vacancy posting, ω¯ (1 + ϕt). This introduces a countercyclical wedge that has the potential
to magnify productivity shocks. If the real wage is sufficiently sluggish, the adjustments of
quantities on the labor market can thus be large.
3.4 Wages
The wage is the solution of the maximization of the generalized Nash product maxwt
(
VFt
λFt
) (VHt
λt
)1−
,
with VFt = ∂W(Ω
F
t )
∂Nt−1
the marginal value of a match for a firm and VHt = ∂W(Ω
H
t )
∂Nt−1
the marginal
household’s surplus from an established employment relationship.  denotes the firm’s share
of a job value, i.e., firms’ bargaining power. The wage curve (WC) is
wt = (b+ Γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ (1− ) ∂Yt
∂Nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+(1− ) (1− s)Et
(1 + ϕt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)

ω¯
Φt+1
(
β
λFt+1
λFt
− µλt+1
λt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+
(
µ
λt+1
λt
)
ω¯θt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Σ)
(12)
where (a) represents the weight of the reservation wage in total wage and (b) + (Σ) is the
workers’ gain from the match. This gain can be decomposed into the marginal productivity
of the new employed worker, (b), and the saving on search costs if the job is not destroyed
next period (Σ). Notice that when firms and workers have the same discount factor (µ = β,
ϕ = 0, thus λt = λFt ), equation (12) collapses to the standard Blanchard & Gali (2010) wage
curve:
wt = (b+ Γ) + (1− ) ∂Yt
∂Nt
+ (1− )(1− s)βEt
[
λt+1
λt
ω¯θt+1
]
(13)
Without financial frictions, flexible wages can make the job surplus insensitive to shocks.
Indeed, an increase in labor productivity ∂Yt
∂Nt
encourages firms to create vacancies. The
resulting increase in the job-finding rate puts upward pressure on wages (through the rise
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in labor market tightness θ in equation (13)). Workers also get a share of the rise in labor
productivity in the wage bargaining process. Procyclical wages then virtually soak up hiring
incentives in booms.
The comparison of (12) with (13) shows that financial frictions enter the wage equation
through term (Σ) and affect wage bargaining directly through the "credit multiplier" ϕ
(term (3)), and indirectly via the gap between agents’ discount rates (term (1)). The "credit
channel" (term (3)) is also at work in Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) and Wasmer & Weil (2004)
and discussed in Monacelli et al. (2011). In booms, financial conditions improve (ϕ goes
down), which reduces workers’ share of the job surplus. Thus, the credit multiplier tends to
strengthen the firm’s bargaining position. The original feature of our model lies in the impa-
tience gap between the firm and the worker (Term (1)). This impatience gap is proportional
to the expected time the firm has to wait before filling a vacancy (1/Φt+1) and thus to the
average quantity of credit required by firms to finance their hiring policy. In booms, due to
congestion externalities, the firm faces recruiting difficulties and the expected duration of
credit (used to finance hiring costs) expands. Without impatience gap, agents perceive sym-
metrically the credit costs induced by the financial constraint: in this case, term (1) cancels
out. In contrast, because of the impatience gap, the more impatient the entrepreneurs (the
future matters less for entrepreneurs than for workers), the lower their assessment of the
value of filled jobs, and thus the match surplus. As a result, entrepreneurs are reluctant to
accept wage increases in booms. This introduces an original counter-cyclical component in
the wage equation. Therefore, financial frictions à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997) (and more
precisely, the impatience gap between workers and entrepreneurs) introduce a wage moder-
ation component that makes the match surplus more responsive to shocks. In section 4 we
will discuss under which conditions this mechanism can produce sizeable fluctuations in the
labor market tightness and the job finding rate so as to solve the Shimer puzzle.
3.5 Markets clearing
In order to close the model, we assume that the government does not accumulate debt and
pays unemployment benefits using a lump-sum tax; i.e., Tt = −(1−Nt)bt. The private-debt
market clears. Good market equilibrium requires the condition Yt = NtCnt + (1 − Nt)Cut +
ω¯Vt + C
F
t . Finally, we assume that land supply is fixed and that the land market clears in
each period; i.e., Lt = 1.
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4 Large welfare costs of fluctuations and volatile labor
market: a non-trivial coincidence
In order to provide intuitions for the mechanisms at work, we examine in this section a
simplified version of the model: workers are assumed to be risk neutral. We first deduce that
welfare costs of the business cycle are reduced to production losses, i.e. the gap between
deterministic steady-state unemployment and the average unemployment of the stochastic
economy. Secondly the financial frictions must then be captured by an ad-hoc function
linking financial imperfections to an exogenous labor productivity shock. We look at the
model’s equations at the steady state and compare its deterministic unemployment level (in
the stabilized economy) and to its predictions on average unemployment (in the fluctuating
economy around the steady state).
Let us denote y the exogenous labor productivity shock. The labor market equilibrium is
defined by the combination of the Beveridge curve (BC), the job creation (JC) and the wage
curve (WC) at the steady state:25
(BC) u(θ(y)) =
s
s+ Ψ(θ(y))
(14)
(JC)
ω(ϕ(y))
Φ(y)
=
y − w(θ(y), ϕ(y), y)
1− (1− s) β (15)
(WC) w(θ(y), ϕ(y), y) = (b+ Γ) + (1− ) (y + Σ(θ(y), ϕ(y), y)) (16)
where ω(ϕ(y)) = ω¯ (1 + ϕ(y)) and
Σ(θ(y), ϕ(y), y) = (1− s)βω(ϕ(y))θ(y) + (1− s)β ϕ(y)
1− ϕ(y)ω(ϕ(y))
(
θ(y)− 1
Φ(θ(y))
)
(17)
Ψ(θ(y)) = χθ(y)ψ, equivalently Φ(θ(y)) = χθ(y)ψ−1 (18)
ϕ(y) = 1− β
µ
yζ (19)
Equation (17) captures the savings on search costs, Σ, if the job is not destroyed next
period. Σ can be decomposed into two parts: i) the standard component proportional to
θ(y) – that summarizes recruiting difficulties (i.e. the last term on RHS of the standard
DMP wage equation (13), which is also the first term of the RHS of equation (17)) and ii)
an original component that captures the interactions between financial and labor market
25The Beveridge curve (BC) is derived from labor market flows, equation (1); the job creation (JC) comes
from equation (11) and the wage curve (WC) is equation (12) in which we use the steady-state relationship
between discount rates in first-order conditions (28) and (32) in Appendix B.
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frictions (i.e., respectively ϕ(y) and θ(y) that are in the second part of the RHS of equation
(17)). Equation (18) is the matching function written equivalently for the job finding rate
Ψ or the probability to fill a vacancy Φ. In equation (19), we approximate the impact of
financial frictions on the labor market with ϕ(y) where ζ > 0. Consistently with our DSGE
model, we assume ϕ′(y) < 0, i.e., during booms, the cost of credit falls.26 When ζ = 0 and
β = µ, there are no financial frictions (ϕ(y) = 0) and we recover the standard DMP model
as a special case of our simplified model. We provide in this section economic intuitions.
Formal demonstrations are reported in Appendix C.
4.1 The dynamics of the Beveridge curve
With risk neutral agents, welfare costs of fluctuations are captured by the gap between the
unconditional expectation of the unemployment rate E0u and its deterministic counterpart
u. Unemployment dynamics are determined by the Beveridge Curve (BC). Equation (14)
at the steady state yields the deterministic unemployment level:
u =
s
s+ Ψ¯
(20)
where x¯ denotes the steady-state value of variable x. Equation (20) underlines that unem-
ployment is a convex function of the job finding rate Ψ. This non-linearity implies that in
an economy with a fluctuating job finding rate (hereafter JFR), unemployment rises sharply
in recession while it falls moderately in expansion. As a result, average unemployment
(hence average consumption) is higher (is lower) than stabilized unemployment (stabilized
consumption), thereby generating welfare costs of fluctuations. A simple way of deriving this
unemployment gap consists in computing a second-order Taylor expansion of (14) around
the steady state, we get
E0u− u ≈ − s
(s+ Ψ¯)2
(E0Ψ− Ψ¯) + s
(s+ Ψ¯)3
E0(Ψ− Ψ¯)2 (21)
Therefore, the gap between average unemployment (E0u) and its deterministic steady state
(u¯) depends (i) on the gap between average JFR (E0Ψ) and its deterministic steady state
(Ψ¯), and (ii) on JFR volatility E0(Ψ − Ψ¯)2. Taking a second-order Taylor expansion of Ψ
by using the matching function (18) yields
E0Ψ− Ψ¯ ≈ 1
2
(Ψ′′θ′ + Ψ′θ′′)E0(y − y¯)2 and σ2Ψ ≡ E0(Ψ− Ψ¯)2 = (Ψ′θ′)2σ2y (22)
26We also assume that the upper bound of the y-distribution is lower than (µ/β)1/ζ , so that ϕ(y) > 0.
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where E(y) = y = 1.27 Equation (21) becomes
E0u− u ≈ − s
(s+ Ψ¯)2
1
2
(Ψ′′θ′︸︷︷︸
G1
+ Ψ′θ′′︸︷︷︸
G2
)σ2y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Curvature of hiring decisions
+
s
(s+ Ψ¯)3
(Ψ′θ′)2σ2y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Curvature of (BC)
(23)
Notice that, because of the matching function (18), JFR is increasing (Ψ′ > 0) and concave
(Ψ′′ < 0). In addition, in booms, labor market tightness increases (θ′ > 0) while the sign
of θ′′ is not a priori known. As a result, the first and third terms in equation (23) tend to
increase welfare costs while the impact of middle term G2 depends on the sign of θ′′.
Equation (23) has several interesting features. First, equation (23) illustrates the importance
of taking into account non-linearity in the Beveridge curve (Curvature of (BC)) to produce
potentially sizeable welfare costs of fluctuations:28 Only by taking into account non-linear
dynamics between unemployment and JFR, do we get a gap between average and determin-
istic unemployment due to asymmetries in unemployment dynamics. Indeed, during booms,
the increase in JFR is partly offset by the decrease in unemployment. In recessions, the fall
in JFR is amplified by the increase in unemployment. The fall in JFR in recessions is then
larger than the JFR rise in expansions. Hence, average JFR is lower than its deterministic
counterpart (E0Ψ − Ψ¯ < 0). Then, in equation (21), average unemployment lies above its
steady-state value. This gap is also magnified by JFR volatility (σ2Ψ).
Second, in the economic mechanisms described above, we look at the gap between average
JFR (E0Ψ) and its deterministic counterpart (Ψ¯), which, in equation (22), depends on the
concavity of the matching function (Ψ′ and Ψ′′), the responsiveness of labor market tightness
to aggregate shocks θ′ and the curvature of labor market tightness θ′′. Notice also that
equation (23) shows why large JFR fluctuations (and thus the necessity to solve the Shimer
puzzle) are a key element to obtain sizeable welfare costs of business cycles. Indeed, a large
θ′ (that appears twice in equation (23)) widens the gap E0u− u.
Finally, financial frictions enter the picture through their effect on fluctuations of labor
market tightness θ. In particular, financial frictions affect welfare costs through two channels:
(i) the size of JFR fluctuations, which depends on θ′, and (ii) the curvature of labor market
27For the sake of brevity, we denote as Ψ′ the first derivative of JFR Ψ with respect to labor market
tightness θ around the steady state θ, and θ′ the first derivative of labor market tightness with respect to
exogenous labor market productivity y around the steady state y. The same notations apply to second
derivatives.
28A first-order Taylor expansion of the JFR equation would yield Ψ ≈ Ψ+Ψ′θ′(y−y). Taking expectations
of this expression, we get E0Ψ−Ψ ≈ 0 as E0y = y. As a result, (21) would imply, in a first-order expansion,
E0u− u ≈ 0. Welfare costs of fluctuations are zero as falls in unemployment in booms exactly compensates
the rise in unemployment in recessions.
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tightness, which determines the sign of θ′′. In what follows we analyze the role of both
component.
4.2 Shimer puzzle, financial frictions and the size of job finding rate
fluctuations
In this section we examine the response of labor market tightness to productivity shocks
(i.e., θ′ in equation (23)), in a model with and without financial frictions (hereafter FF ).
It is straightforward to see in (23) that the larger θ′, the greater the response of JFR to
aggregate shocks, the more sizable welfare costs of fluctuations and the closer the model to
the data (hence, solving Shimer (2005)’s puzzle).
Proposition 1. Financial frictions (FF) can lead to larger fluctuations of labor market
tightness, i.e. θ′|FF > θ′|noFF : the response of labor market tightness to an exogenous
productivity shock can be higher in a model with FF with respect to a standard DMP model.
Proof. See Appendix C.1 for a derivation of parameter restrictions such that proposition 1
holds.
Shimer (2005) points out that the standard DMP model fails to generate realistic JFR
fluctuations (i.e. θ′|noFF is too low). Indeed, following a positive productivity shock, firms
are enticed to post more vacancies, which raises labor market tightness. However, higher
wages (higher labor productivity pushes wage upward in equation (13)) absorb most of
the productivity increase (higher w in equation (15)), eliminating the incentive for vacancy
creation. The pro-cyclical wage response tends to dampen firms’ hiring incentives in booms,
which generates low JFR volatility, hence low welfare costs of fluctuations.29
Proposition 1 shows that the financial frictions can magnify the impact of the business cycle
on JFR volatility (θ′|FF > θ′|noFF ), without assuming ad-hoc wage rigidity. This result is
not trivial. Indeed, one the one hand, FF have a direct impact on hiring costs for each firm:
in boom, the credit cost ϕ is reduced, and so are hiring costs (ϕ goes down on the LHS
of equation (15)). This force magnifies the impact of productivity shocks on labor market
tightness (the "credit multiplier" effect). In addition, the endogenous wage dynamics must
not be too pro-cyclical so as to make the decline in the hiring costs in booms a dominant
driver of job creation (the increase in w must be limited in equation (15). This is the
29Assuming a limited wage response to the business cycle (with low workers’ low bargaining power as
in Hagendorn & Manovskii (2008) or wage rigidity as initially suggested by Hall (2005b)) helps the model
generate data-consistent JFR volatility.
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economic interpretation of parameter restrictions derived in Appendix C.1). This is made
possible through FF. Indeed, FF actually introduce new components in (WC), which induces
an endogenous wage rigidity: the impatience gap introduces a countercyclical component in
wages. In booms, the average duration to fill a vacancy goes up30, which increases the
quantity of credit the firm needs to borrow but the surplus from the match that will be used
to finance these credit costs is perceived to be lower by the impatient entrepreneur than by
the (patient) worker.31 This makes the entrepreneur more reluctant to accept wage increases
in booms. This counter-cyclical component in the wage setting rule is the channel through
which our model can generate an endogenous wage rigidity, leading to θ′|FF > θ′|noFF . This
channel is specific to Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)’s model.
Under parameter restrictions, FF can then increase the sensitivity of the JFR to productivity
shocks y, leading to a larger gap E0u−u in a economy with FF than without FF. A byproduct
of this result is that FF can increase the sensitivity of the labor market tightness to the
business cycle, and solve the Shimer puzzle. Note that the model must reproduce not only
labor market fluctuations but also match volatility of financial variables, which we did not
analyze here. This will be done in section 5.
4.3 The concavity of labor market tightness with respect to aggre-
gate shocks
We now shift our attention to term G2 in equation (23), which incorporates θ′′. Given
our matching function, equation (18), JFR is a positive function of labor market tightness,
Ψ′ > 0. Therefore, this term increases welfare costs of fluctuations only if θ′′ < 0.
Proposition 2. Without financial frictions, the model only exhibits a θ-convexity (i.e. θ′′ >
0), whereas, with financial frictions, the model can exhibit a θ-concavity (i.e. θ′′ < 0).
Proof. See Appendix C.2 for a derivation of parameter restrictions such that proposition 2
holds.
The economic intuition of Proposition 2 relies on the job creation condition JC, equation
(15). The latter relates vacancy posting costs on the LHS to labor market tightness θ on the
RHS. Two opposite forces are at work in response to a productivity shock.
30This is measured by the decline in the probability to fill a vacancy Φ due to strong congestion effects
for firms, and thus the increase in the average cost of recruiting ω¯Φ .
31In equation (17), the last term on the RHS, −ωΦϕ, captures the wage reduction induced by the smaller
evaluation of the match surplus by the impatient entrepreneur). This term is absent in the standard DMP
wage equation.
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1. During booms, as unemployment falls, hiring takes more time so that firms create
more vacancies to reach their targeted employment level. To the contrary, during
recessions, hiring is not difficult because the unemployment rate is large. Thus, a
slight fall in vacancies is enough to meet the job creation condition. Labor market
tightness hence increases more in expansion than it falls in recession. Indeed, given
that the matching function exhibits decreasing marginal returns to vacancies, the job
creation condition JC is satisfied for greater variations in job creation during booms
than during recessions.
Without financial frictions, these mechanisms unambiguously lead the hiring decision
rule –i.e., θ – to be a convex function of productivity shocks, θ′′ > 0. Thus, average
labor market tightness is greater than its deterministic steady-state value. This reduces
the gap E0u − u, thereby dampening welfare costs of the business cycle. Notice that
this latter effect on θ′′ was emphasized by Hairault et al. (2010) in a standard DMP
model. This result also holds in a model without financial frictions and with rigid real
wages.
2. Financial frictions introduce a new component into the wage equation. In booms, the
large increases in the labor market tightness also signal a rise in the credit cost –
included in the bargained wage because entrepreneurs perceive less future profits than
workers. Given that the credit duration32 increases more in booms than it declines in
recessions, smaller variations of the labor market tightness are needed in booms than in
recessions to satisfy the job creation condition. This mechanism can lead labor market
tightness to be a concave function of productivity (θ′′ < 0).
The two forces work in opposite directions in the fluctuating economy: the first effect in-
creases average JFR while the second one lowers it. Notice that the second effect is specific
to financial frictions and constitute an additional channel widening the gap between average
unemployment and its value at the deterministic steady state – and therefore, enlarging the
welfare costs of fluctuations. In Appendix C.2, we derive a threshold degree for financial
frictions to produce θ-concavity. We show that when financial frictions are strong enough,
they increase welfare costs of fluctuations. They are thus at the heart of the large magnitude
of business cycle costs in our model.
Notice finally that the second force, that generates θ-concavity, is due to the endogenous
wage-adjustment mechanism. Therefore, the extreme assumption of exogenous rigid wages
cannot generate this θ-concavity in a model with financial frictions. In fact, under rigid
32These costs are directly linked to the increase in the time duration to fill a vacancy 1Φ .
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wages, financial frictions magnify the impact of productivity shocks on the surplus from the
match. This then leads to more convex decision rules on θ. Notice also that, for both large
degrees of financial imperfections and exogenous rigid wages, the resulting θ-convexity can
even induce welfare gains: in response to positive productivity shocks, firms enjoy both an
increase in productivity and a fall in credit costs. As wages do not increase in expansion, firms
may benefit so much from booms that average unemployment can lie below its deterministic
value, thereby generating welfare gains of fluctuations. This point is analytically derived in
Appendix C.2 and illustrated in section 5.4.1.
5 Quantitative analysis
Our theoretical analysis does not yield any prediction on the volatility of financial variables.
We then need a calibrated full DSGE model to assess this point. We also need the DSGE
model to see whether parameter restrictions found in the simplified model hold or not in a
realistic model of the US economy. For our quantitative calculation of business-cycle costs
to be relevant, we need to match the volatility of data. Overcoming the "Shimer puzzle" is
thus a necessary condition for our exercise. Finally, we will use the full DSGE model for the
sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Calibration
Preference, technology and shocks. The calibration is based on quarterly US data.
The discount factor for patient agents is consistent with a 4% annual real interest rate. For
the impatient consumer, we set β = 0.99, which is within the range of values chosen by
Iacoviello (2005)33. The risk aversion is set to 1 for firms and 2 for workers. Both values
lie within a standard interval in the literature. In addition, the firm is characterized by a
lower risk aversion because, as shown by Iacoviello (2005), such a calibration ensures that the
borrowing constraint is binding for a wide range of volatility shocks, impatience levels, and
loan-to-value ratios (m values). The technological shock is calibrated as in Hairault et al.
(2010). We choose the standard deviation of technological shock to reproduce the observed
GDP standard deviation.
Financial frictions. The corporate debt-to-GDP ratio pins down the value of m in the
collateral constraint. To this end, we use the average corporate debt over GDP for 2001-
33Notice that an extremely low degree of impatience heterogeneity is sufficient for debt limits to hold.
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2009 (debt outstanding, annual data, corporate sector, Flow of Funds Accounts tables of the
Federal Reserve Board, see Appendix A).
Labor market. Employment level N is consistent with the average unemployment rate
(N = 0.88) estimates of Hall (2005a).34 As in Shimer (2005), the quarterly separation rate
s is 0.10, so jobs last for about 2.5 years on average. Using steady-state labor-market flows,
we infer Ψ given s and N . This leads to Ψ = 0.423. This value is lower than in the usual
DMP model. Indeed, the pool of job seekers is larger in Blanchard & Gali (2010) than
in the standard DMP model. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to the
number of job seekers is ψ = 0.5, which lies within the range estimated in Petrongolo &
Pissarides (2001). The efficiency of matching, χ, is set such that firms with a vacancy find a
worker within a quarter with a 95% probability, which is consistent with Andolfatto (1996).
The cost of posting a vacancy, ω¯, is set to 0.17 as in Barron & Bishop (1985) and Barron
et al. (1997). We obtain ω¯V
Y
= 0.0179, which is within the range found in the literature
(0.005 in Chéron & Langot (2004) or 0.05 in Krause & Lubik (2007)). The utility of leisure
parameter, Γ, is pinned down so as to match b = 0.7 as in Hall & Milgrom (2008). We
obtain Γ = 0.18, leading to b + Γ = 0.88, a lower value than one used by Hagendorn &
Manovskii (2008) (b = 0.95 with Γ = 0). It is also lower than the parameters combination
allowing Hall & Milgrom (2008) to control for the unemployment rate, namely the sum of
leisure value (b = 0.71 with Γ = 0) and the "employer’s cost of delay" (ς = 0.27) which leads
to b+ ς = 0.98. Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
5.2 Matching business-cycle volatility
In this section, we document the unconditional business cycles facts on financial variables
and labor market adjustments. Our contribution lies also in bringing together financial
data (from Jermann & Quadrini (2012)) and data from the labor market literature (Shimer
(2012)). In both markets, we focus on fluctuations in quantities (debt, unemployment) as
well as equilibrium prices (interest rate, wage).35 Table 2, column (1), reports business-cycle
34According to Hall (2005a), the observed high transition rate from “out of the labor force” directly to
employment suggests that a fraction of those classified as out of the labor force are nonetheless effectively
job-seekers. Hall (2005a) adjusts the US unemployment rate to include individuals out of the labor force
who are actually looking for a job.
35All data have been recomputed and updated so that our sample covers five recession episodes from
1976 January through January 2013 (see Appendix A for a complete description of the data set). Previous
works that study the interaction between financial and real variables in DSGE models such as Monacelli
et al. (2011) and Christiano et al. (2010) summarize labor market adjustments using only fluctuations in
employment and unemployment.
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Table 1: Calibration
(a) External information
Notation Label value Reference
β discount factor (impatient) 0.99 Iacoviello (2005)
α production function 0.99 Iacoviello (2005)
σW risk aversion, worker 2
σF risk aversion, firm 1 Iacoviello (2005)
s Job separation rate 0.1 Shimer (2005)
N Employment 0.88 Hall (2005a)
ψ Elasticity of the matching function 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
ω¯ cost of job posting 0.17 Barron et al. (1997) and Barron & Bishop (1985)
b
w
replacement ratio 0.7 Hall & Milgrom (2008)
A average TFP 1 Normalization
ρA Persistence 0.95 Hairault et al. (2010)
(b) Empirical target
Notation Label value Empirical target
µ discount factor (patient) 1/(1.04
1
4 ) Annual real rate of 0.04
χ scale parameter of matching function 0.634 Probability of filling a vacancy Φ = 0.95
m collateral constraint 0.61 corporate debt to GDP ratio B/Y= 0.595
σA Standard deviation 0.0031 Observed σY
(c) Derived parameter values
Notation Label value
Ψ Job finding rate 0.423
Γ preference 0.18
properties found in the data.
The volatility of real wages is not close to zero in the data. Moreover, it is larger than that
of labor productivity. This clearly suggests that real wage rigidity (implying a zero standard
deviation for fluctuations in w) is not a realistic explanation for the strong cyclicality of
labor market aggregates. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies corr(Ut, Vt)
summarizes the dynamics around the Beveridge curve. The negative covariance is consistent
with the view that aggregate shocks are more important than reallocation shocks at business-
cycle frequency. As expected, the correlation between unemployment and job finding rate
corr(Ut,Ψt) is negative. Jung & Kuester (2011) point out that mean unemployment exceeds
steady-state unemployment when the job-finding rate and the unemployment rate are non-
positively correlated and the average job-finding rate is lower than the steady-state job-
finding rate.36 This is the case in our model. Comparing columns (1) and (2) of Table
36This can be inferred from the employment-flow equation taken at the steady state sNt = ΨUt where
Nt = 1− Ut. Hence, sE(1t − Ut) = cov(Ut,Ψt) + E(Ut)E(Ψt). Subtracting the steady state from both sides
of the above equation, leads to E(Ut)−ut = − 1s+Ψ [cov(Ut,Ψt) + (E(Ψt)−Ψt)E(Ut)]. We deduce that if (i)
E(Ψt)−Ψt < 0 and (ii) cov(Ut,Ψt) < 0, then necessarily, E(Ut)− ut > 0. The correlation at the bottom of
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Table 2: Business-cycle volatility : Models versus data
(1) (2) (3)
Data Benchmark Without
Model Financial
Frictions
std(.) std(.) std(.)
Y 1.44 ** 1.44 ** 1.44 **
C 0.81 * 0.88 * 0.94 *
N 0.72 * 0.74 * 0.46 *
Y/N 0.54 * 0.28 * 0.56 *
w 0.62 * 0.49 * 0.49 *
U 7.90 * 5.45 * 3.71 *
Ψ 5.46 * 6.26 * 2.79 *
V 9.96 * 12.7 * 4.60 *
B 1.68 * 1.35 *
q 3.21 * 2.59 *
corr(U,Ψ) -0.91 -0.86 -0.92
corr(U, V ) -0.97 -0.71 -0.76
** std (in percentage); * relative to GDP std
Colum (1) US Data, see Appendix A
σA = 0.0031 in column (2); σA = 0.00615 in column (3)
2, we note that the model generates volatile employment, vacancies, unemployment, and
job-finding rates. The simulated volatilities of vacancy and job finding rate are even a bit
higher than the observed volatilities, as we tend to slightly underestimate wage volatility.
Interestingly, the predicted volatile adjustments on the labor market are not obtained under
unrealistic fluctuations on financial markets. The model also reproduces fluctuations of
corporate debt, nearly as volatile as in the data. Similar conclusions apply to the dynamics
of land prices q. When the model is simulated without financial frictions (Table 2, column (3)
and with a TFP process adjusted to match the volatility of output, the standard deviation of
the job-finding rate relative to GDP is twice lower. Moreover, the relative standard deviation
of the wage is the same as in the model with financial frictions, whereas the volatility of the
outside option (given by θ̂ = 1
ψ
Ψ̂ > Ψ̂) is more than twice as small. This clearly confirms
that financial frictions dampen large movements in workers’ outside options in the Nash
bargained wage rule.
Matching volatility on the labor market: main mechanisms at work. Quantitative
results suggest that parameter restrictions in Appendix C.1 hold in the full-fledged model.
Economic intuitions have been discussed in section 4.
Table 2 suggests that ii) holds in the data.
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Matching volatility on the financial market : main mechanisms at work. The
model is able to replicate the volatility on the debt market. First, as the quantity of land
does not adjust over the business cycle (which is a realistic assumption), any change in land
demand results in a change in the real estate price q. Our model is then able to match the
volatility of real-estate prices q.
It is noticeable that the model also reproduces a realistic volatility of corporate debt, B.
To explain the intuition, let us consider a log-linearized version of the binding borrowing
constraint, equation (9). The variance of the price of collateral is equal to the sum of the
variance of corporate debt, vacancies and the covariance between debt and vacancies. In a
model without interactions between labor and financial frictions, vacancies would not appear
in the borrowing constraint. In this case, the variance of the price of collateral would equal
the variance of corporate debt. Thus, the model would predict fluctuations in corporate debt
as large as real-estate price q – which is counterfactual. In contrast, in our model, because
of vacancies in the borrowing constraint we can predict a large variance of the real-estate
price as well as a lower variance of corporate debt. This is due to the impact of the large
variance of vacancies and the positive covariance between debt and vacancies. Hence, the
interaction between labor and financial frictions also makes the model consistent with the
observed volatility of financial variables.
5.3 Welfare cost of fluctuations
Decomposing the welfare cost of fluctuations. The expected lifetime utility of a
worker is W˜w = E0
∑∞
t=0 µ
tU (Ct + (1−Nt)Γ), because Ct ≡ NtCnt + (1 − Nt)Cut and the
FOC on consumption imply Cnt = Cut +Γ. We define welfare costs of business cycles, τ , as the
fraction of steady-state consumption that workers would give up to be indifferent between
the steady-state and the fluctuating economy. Welfare costs of fluctuations τ are such that∑∞
t=0 µ
tU
(
[C¯ + (1− N¯)Γ](1− τ)) = W˜w, where variables marked with an overbar denote
their steady-state values.37 We deduce
τ = 1−
[
W˜w (1− µ) (1− σ)
(C¯ + (1− N¯)Γ)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
37A similar computation is possible for the firm’s owner:
∑∞
t=0 β
tU
(
C¯F (1− τF )) = W˜F =∑∞
t=0 β
tU
(
CFt
)
. When introducing financial frictions, firms’ welfare costs of fluctuations can also be taken
into account. In this case, aggregate welfare costs would then be greater. We choose to focus on workers’
welfare costs only to compare our results to the existing literature.
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The result is reported in Table 3, line 1, column A. The business-cycle cost of fluctuations
with financial frictions is 2.50% of workers’ permanent consumption. This number is far
larger than the estimates found by Lucas (1987, 2003), who reports a welfare cost of τ =
0.05% with log utility. Notably, welfare costs are large even though agents can save by
lending to firms; workers can actually smooth business cycles with savings.
One way to understand these quantitative results is to decompose the welfare cost into a
"level effect" and a "business-cycle effect". The former component is due to the gap between
the average level of consumption in the fluctuating economy E0C and its counterpart in the
stabilized steady-state economy C. The latter, the "business-cycle effect", entails costs that
are directly derived from volatility in the economy, as in Lucas (1987, 2003). We use a
second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function in the volatile economy. The crucial
point at this stage is to consider the Taylor expansion around the mean of the stochastic
economy, and not around the deterministic steady state. This ensures that the computation
takes into account the gap between the mean (i.e., the stochastic steady state) and the
deterministic steady state. We approximate welfare in the volatile economy as the sum of a
consumption gap and Lucas’ original measure. Indeed, we have
W˜w ≈ 1
1− µU (E0[C + (1−N)Γ])
[
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ) (γcV ar(ĉ) + γuV ar(û) + γcuCov(ĉ, û))
]
where we denote38 x̂ = Xt−E0[X]E0[X] , for x = C,U and γc =
E0[C2]
E0[(C+(1−N)Γ)2] , γu =
Γ2E0[(1−N)2]
E0[(C+(1−N)Γ)2]
and γcu = 2ΓE0[C(1−N)]E0[(C+(1−N)Γ)2] . This leads to
1− τ ≈
(
E0[C + (1−N)Γ]
C¯ + (1− N¯)Γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−τGap
[
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ) (γcV ar(ĉ) + γuV ar(û) + γcuCov(ĉ, û))
] 1
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−τBC
(24)
τBC denotes the welfare costs of business cycles computed in the spirit of Lucas (1987,
2003) while τGap denotes the welfare costs of the business cycle linked to the consumption
gap between average and steady-state consumption. As consumption and labor are not
separable in the utility function (equation (3)), unemployment also matters in τ . In addition,
(1− τ) = (1− τBC)(1− τGap) so that τ ≈ τBC + τGap.
Welfare costs due to business-cycle fluctuations alone, in the spirit of Lucas’ measure, τBC ,
are reported in Table 3, line 3, column A, and equal 0.27% of permanent consumption for
38Indeed, given that ∂U∂C = U
′, ∂U∂N = −ΓU ′, ∂
2U
∂C2 = U
′′, ∂
2U
∂N2 = Γ
2U ′′ and ∂
2U
∂C∂N = −ΓU ′′, we obtain, with
the usual functional form U(x) = x
1−σ
1−σ , U
′ = x−σ and U ′′ = −σx−σ−1 = −σ(1− σ)x1−σ1−σ 1x2 .
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Table 3: Decomposition of welfare costs of business cycle
Worker Worker
with financial frictions without financial frictions
A B
Total welfare cost
1. τ × 100 2.50 0.12
Decomposing the welfare cost
2. τGap × 100 2.23 0.09
3. τBC × 100 0.27 0.03
line 1 = line 2 + line 3. σA = 0.0031 in all columns.
workers. They are five times as large as in Lucas (1987, 2003) (0.05%). This first result comes
from labor-market fluctuations (which are magnified by financial frictions). The latter are
neglected by Lucas. In our model, τBC is a function of not only V ar(ĉ), as in Lucas, but
also V ar(û) and Cov(ĉ, û), which, for a given "level effect", clearly magnify the costs of
cycles. The most striking result is the measure of τGap = 2.23% in Table 3, line 2, column
A. It accounts for the great increase in business-cycle costs: 90% of welfare costs come from
this consumption gap. In fact, in Lucas (1987, 2003), τGap = 0 : average consumption
coincides with steady-state consumption. Our model shows that this approximation is not
acceptable because business-cycle volatility significantly affects the gap between average and
steady-state employment and consumption. Thus, business-cycle costs are sizable: they are
50 times the amount estimated by Lucas.
Without financial frictions, workers’ welfare cost falls drastically (100 × τ = 0.12, line 1,
column B, Table 3).39 The magnitude of business-cycle costs is reduced to 2.4 times Lucas’
evaluation. This estimation is slightly lower than the value reported in Hairault et al. (2010)
or Jung & Kuester (2011). In our model, wages are set by using a Nash bargaining solution
while Hairault et al. (2010) and Jung & Kuester (2011) assume exogenous wage rigidity
or sluggishness. Finally, in the model without financial frictions, under a calibration that
mimics the first-order allocation (i.e., b = 0, no unemployment allocation and the Hosios
condition  = ψ), welfare costs are negligible (0.02%). Welfare costs in the first-best economy
are substantially lower than that which arises in presence of realistic financial and search
39This estimate is computed by using our model without both discounting heterogeneity and collateral
constraints. We consider the parameter values in Table 1 (panels (b) and (c)). The rationale behind this
approach is the following. The model with financial frictions is considered as the "true" model of the
economy. By calibrating the model so as to match key financial and labor market targets, we uncover the
"true" parameter values. The business-cycle costs without financial frictions are then computed with these
parameter values, including the standard deviation of technological shocks (σA = 0.0031). If we adjust the
standard deviation of technological shocks to match output volatility in the model without financial frictions,
the welfare costs amount to 0.41% of permanent consumption. This remains far below the values reported
in the model with financial frictions.
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and matching frictions.
If we apply our computations to the data, the contrast with Lucas’s results is straightforward.
The level effect associated with employment only is 100 × N¯−E(N)
N¯
= 3.15, i.e. a loss of 4.7
millions jobs in 2015 and a GDP per capita loss of approximately 1520 dollars a year.
Without financial frictions, the level effect entails a loss of about 100.000 jobs, and each
household loses 38 dollars per year.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
Table 4 reports quantitative results when the model is modified along one dimension at
the time. Appendix D reports further details on model equations and calibration for each
exercise.
Table 4: Welfare costs of business cycles: Sensitivity analysis
Benchmark Sluggish Higher Γ Utility Financial Capital Financial shocks Capital
wage function shocks as collateral Capital wage and
investment costs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
τ × 100 2.50 -0.13 0.76 2.72 1.79 2.67 3.4 3.39
In each experiment, we adjust the volatility of aggregate shocks σA in order to match the output volatility from the data (1.44 as
reported in Table 2).
5.4.1 Exogenous sluggish wage
Column (2) of Table 4 accounts for wage sluggishness, as initially suggested by Hall (2005b).
The wage is determined by
w˜t = γ˜w
Nash
t + (1− γ˜)w˜t−1
where wNasht refers to the Nash-bargained wage from equation (12). The benchmark cal-
ibration is such that γ˜ = 1, which entails wage volatility close to the data (see Table 2).
We aim at illustrating40 that wage rigidity with financial frictions can reduce welfare costs
of fluctuations (see discussion in Section 4 and analytical results in Appendix C). If wage
sluggishness is large enough, the model with financial frictions can actually generate welfare
gains of fluctuations because firms benefit so much from expansions that average unemploy-
ment can be lower than its deterministic counterpart. Simulation results in column (2) of
Table 4 illustrate this point. With a very low γ˜ = 0.3, the model generates welfare gains of
fluctuations (of 0.13%).
40We do not necessarily push here the idea that wage sluggishness is needed.
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5.4.2 Utility function
The value of non-employment relative to the value of market work. In our
model, business cycles induce a large average unemployment rate with respect to its de-
terministic counterpart. The extent to which this translates into greater welfare costs of
business cycles depends on the value of non-employment relative to the value of work. In
our utility function (equation (3)), Γ captures the additional utility derived from leisure
when the worker is unemployed. As the value of being unemployed increases relative to the
value of employment, high average unemployment relative to deterministic unemployment
can actually please workers, in spite of lower output and lower consumption (as can be seen
from the expression of τGap in equation (24)). Indeed, with higher Γ (column (3) of Table
4), welfare costs of fluctuations goes down to 0.76% versus 2.5% in the benchmark case.
We argue that the benchmark calibration of Γ is the relevant one. It is derived at the steady
state so as to be consistent with Hall & Milgrom (2008)’s unemployment benefits and steady-
state labor-market characteristics (see section 5.1). In order to get a higher value of Γ, we
here arbitrarily lower unemployment benefit replacement ratio to a small level of 0.5. This
yields Γ = 0.38 instead of 0.18 in the benchmark calibration.
Utility function. With the benchmark utility function (3), wages are not affected by
consumption-savings intertemporal choices. Hansen (1985) and Jung & Kuester (2011) con-
sider an alternative utility function in which this is not the case. 41 Results in column (4)
of Table 4 have been computed by using the following utility function 42
Ct
1−σ
1− σ − ΓNt (25)
with σ > 0 the relative risk aversion. We compute the corresponding expression of τ . Unlike
in the benchmark case, labor and consumption are separable. As a result, the expression
of τ does not involve covariances between consumption and labor.43 We also find sizeable
welfare costs of fluctuations (2.72%).
41Differently from the benchmark model, at the steady state, the wage equation (49) in Appendix D.2
exhibits a first term, reservation wage, involving worker marginal consumption utility λ. In contrast, marginal
consumption utility around the steady state in our benchmark model – captured by λ and λF in equation
(16) – does not affect the wage.
42Indivisible labor creates ex-post heterogeneity across agents as some work, others don’t. However, we
consider a representative agent in our model. We consider only this utility function as, with indivisible
labor and this utility function, the solution of the representative agent’s problem can be supported by a
competitive equilibrium. See Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) for a formal proof.
43See Appendix D.2 for a description of the model, calibration and analytical computation of τ
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5.4.3 Financial Shocks
In column (5) of Table 4, we report the welfare costs when the model is augmented with
financial shocks. The latter are captured as shocks to parameterm in the collateral constraint
(equation (9)), as in Jermann & Quadrini (2012) and Liu et al. (2013). The calibration of
the shock is based on Liu et al. (2013).44 Welfare costs in an economy with technological
and financial shocks decrease to 1.79% versus 2.5% in the benchmark case. Because financial
shocks introduce more uncertainty on the value that banks can recover from the collateral,
the land price needs to incorporate a premium (average land price is greater than its steady-
state value: E(q) > q). Thus, wealth increases on average, raising consumption relative
to the case with technological shocks only.45 Financial shocks improve the match between
debt and land-price volatilities (see Column (2) of Table 5 in Appendix D.4), but this shock
induces excess volatility in vacancies.
5.4.4 Adding capital.
Adding capital as collateral. Column (6) of Table 4 incorporates capital into the model
along the lines of Liu et al. (2013).46 The production function now includes physical capital
Kt : Yt = At
[
LφtK
1−φ
t−1
]1−α
Nαt . We also consider adjustment costs on capital such that :
Kt = (1 − δ)Kt−1 + It + (Ω)/2)((It/It−1) − 1)2It where It denotes investment, and δ the
rate of capital depreciation. We consider the same calibration of φ, Ω, and δ as in Liu et al.
(2013). The financial constraint becomes
Bt + ωVt ≤ m
(
Et
[
qkt+1
]
Kt + Et [qt+1]Lt
)
with qk the price of capital. Notice that welfare costs here (2.67%) are greater than in the
benchmark model (2.50%). Indeed, capital amplifies our basic mechanism. As employment
is lower, on average, than in steady state, the marginal productivity of capital is low in the
stochastic economy. The incentive to save is thus reduced. Notice also that, when capital is
included into the collateral constraint, models with technological shocks only are not able to
replicate the volatilities of debt and land price (see column (3) of Table 5 in Appendix D.5),
thereby making the assessment of the welfare cost of fluctuations less convincing.
Finally, the introduction of both capital and financial shocks can be viewed as a solution to
fit the financial indicators of the business cycle as well as those of investment (column (7)
44See Appendix D.3 for more details.
45See Appendix E.1 for a formal analysis of this mechanism using a simplified version of our model.
46See Appendix D.4 for more details.
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of Table 4). Indeed, this proceeds in the right direction, but at the cost of excess volatility
of labor market fluctuations. The reason comes from the very low sensitivity of wages.
Financial frictions are too strong and thus overestimate the wage moderation induced by the
credit channel.47 Notice also that the impact of financial shocks in our model depends on
whether we include capital. In economies without capital (column (5) of Table 4), financial
shocks reduce welfare costs. In contrast, in presence of capital (columns (7)), financial shocks
increase welfare costs. This is because financial shocks make banks’ return on the collateral
more risky. This uncertainty generates a premium on the borrowing constraint (i.e., an over-
accumulation). This in turn generates a new motive to increase debt (B increases in the
volatile economy relative to the stabilized economy), entailing a parallel increase in workers’
wealth. As a result, in our benchmark model without capital consumption is on average
greater than at the steady state. This is not the case when we include capital accumulation.
This latter setting is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. As greater leveraging in
the volatile economy induce additional capital, over-accumulation is then costly in terms of
consumption.48
Including wage and investment costs in the financial constraint. Results in column
(8) of Table 4 account for the inclusion of the wage bill and investment costs into the financial
constraint, as in Millard et al. (2017) 49. The financial constraint is now
Bt + ωVt + wtNt + It ≤ m
(
Et
[
qkt+1
]
Kt + Et [qt+1]Lt
)
The welfare costs of business cycle are larger than in the benchmark case (3.39% versus
2.50%) as the financial constraint includes more elements of the firm’s cost.
Finally, we report in Appendix F results on asymmetric welfare costs of business cycles:
pains from recessions are larger than gains from booms. Petrosky-Nadeau & Zhang (2017)
and Ferraro (2018) investigate the asymmetric behavior of the DMP model in recessions
and expansions. We show that unemployment asymmetry over the business cycle is a key
element also to evaluate the welfare costs of fluctuations. We compute the time-varying
welfare cost and report its empirical distribution for the model with financial and search
frictions and the model with search frictions only. Whatever the model, welfare costs in
47A solution for this shortcoming of this extension would be to consider a more complex modelling of the
collateral constraint as in Liu et al. (2013), where the collateral is not the simple sum of the value of capital
and land, but a weighted sum of these two assets. Given that these weights are unknown, this is left for
future research.
48See Appendix E.2 for an analysis of this mechanism in a Mickey-Mouse model.
49See Appendix D.4.
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recessions are larger than welfare gains in expansion. This result captures the asymmetric
business cycles in our non-linear environment. In addition, the presence of financial frictions
shifts the distribution of welfare costs to regions showing more asymmetry and greater losses:
with FF, welfare costs are larger in recessions while welfare gains remain small in booms.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a quantitative assessment of welfare costs of fluctuations in a labor
market search model with financial frictions à la Kiyotaki & Moore (1997). Because of labor
market search frictions, fluctuations generate a higher average unemployment rate relative to
its steady-state value, thereby increasing the welfare cost of fluctuations. Financial frictions
amplify this mechanism, together with the associated welfare costs. We show that business-
cycle costs are sizable: they are 50 times the amount estimated by Lucas. Without financial
constraints, the magnitude of business-cycle costs is reduced to 2.4 times Lucas’s evaluation.
Our model is able to replicate business-cycle volatilities on both labor and financial mar-
kets. In particular, it reproduces the high degree of responsiveness of the job-finding rate
throughout the business cycle. Indeed, financial frictions entail wage sluggishness that helps
the model match the large changes in job-finding rates observed in the data; at the same
time, it allows for real wage volatility as observed in the data.
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Appendix For Online Publication
A Data
Aggregate data. The following quarterly time series come FRED database, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis’ website (1976Q1-2013Q1). y is Real Gross Domestic Product
from the FRED database (GDPC96) divided by the Civilian Non institutional Population
from the FRED database (CNP16OV). c is Real Personal Consumption Expenditures from
the FRED data-base (PCECC96) divided by the Civilian Non institutional Population from
the FRED database (CNP16OV)
Labor market data. w is Compensation of Employees: Wages & Salary Accruals from
the FRED database (WASCUR) divided by Civilian Employment (CE16OV). N is Civilian
Employment (CE16OV) divided by Civilian Non institutional Population. U is FRED,
Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE), Percent, quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted. The
latter time series are taken from the FRED database. As for the time series of the job
finding rate, we use monthly CPS data from January 1976 to March 2013. We follow all the
steps described in Shimer (2012). As in Shimer (2012), we correct for time aggregation and
take quarterly averages of monthly observations. V are vacancies Total Nonfarm, Total US
Job Openings (JTS00000000JOL), Seasonally Adjusted Monthly data from BLS. We take
quarterly averages of this time series that is available only from December 2000 onwards.
Debt, loan Rate and land price. We follow Jermann & Quadrini (2012). Financial
data come from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board. The debt stock
is constructed by using the cumulative sum of net new borrowing measured by the ‘Net
increase in credit markets instruments of non financial business’50. Since the constructed
stock of debt is measured in nominal terms, it is deflated by the price index for business
value added from NIPA. The initial (nominal) stock of debt is set to 94.12, which is the value
reported in the balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds in 1952.I for the nonfarm non
financial business. The cumulative sum starts in 1952, which, as in Jermann & Quadrini
(2012), is not likely to affect our data starting on January 1976. R is the log of 1+ the
Bank Prime Loan Rate (MPRIME) (used as a reference for short-term business loan) from
50Nonfinancial business; credit market instruments; liability; Net increase in credit markets instruments
of non financial business, millions of dollars (nominal). FA144104005.Q, F.101 Line 28.
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the FRED database. Finally, we use as a proxy for q the price index for residential land as
computed by Liu et al. (2013).
Cyclical components of the data: All data are quarterly (from 1976:Q1 through 2013:Q1),
in logs, HP (λ = 1600) filtered and multiplied by 100 in order to express them in percent de-
viation from steady state. Ψ is the job finding rate computed from Monthly CPS data from
January 1976 to March 2013 using Shimer (2012)’s methodology. It measures the probability
for an unemployed worker to find a job. As for financial data on debt and interest rate, we
follow Jermann & Quadrini (2012). We finally check that our financial and labor market
time series are consistent with the data available on line for Shimer (2012) and Jermann &
Quadrini (2012).
B Model
B.1 Household
Each household knows that the evolution of S follows (2), so that (5) can be written as:
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 + Ψt (1− (1− s)Nt−1) (26)
The dynamic problem of a typical household can be written as follows
W(ΩHt ) = max
Cnt ,C
u
t ,Bt
{
NtU(C
n
t ) + (1−Nt)U(Cut + Γ) + µEtW(ΩHt+1)
}
subject to (26) and (4), given the initial conditions on state variables (N0, B0) and ΩHt =
{Nt−1,Ψt, wt, bt, Tt, Bt−1}, the vector of variables taken as given by households. Let λt be
the shadow price of the budget constraint. The first order conditions associated with con-
sumption choices are
(Cnt )
−σ = (Cut + Γ)
−σ = λt (27)
Hence Ut(Cnt ) = Ut(Cut + Γ). The first order condition associated to bond holdings reads:
−λt + µEt [Rtλt+1] = 0 (28)
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B.2 Entrepreneur
The firm’s program is
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Lt,Bt,Vt,Nt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]} (29)
s.t.

−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − qt [Lt − Lt−1]− wtNt − ω¯Vt
+Yt (At, Lt−1, Nt) +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−Bt − ω¯Vt +mEt [qt+1Lt] = 0 (λFt ϕt)
−Nt + (1− s)Nt−1 + ΦtVt = 0 (ξt)
given the initial conditions N0, B0, where ΩFt = {Nt−1,Ψt, wt, bt, pit, Tt, Bt−1, Lt−1} is the vec-
tor of variables taken as given by firms. Letting λFt , λFt ϕt, and ξt be the Lagrange multipliers
associated to (7), (9) and (10) the first order conditions of the firm problem read:
U ′
(
CFt
)
= λFt (30)
λFt qt = βEt
[
λFt+1
(
qt+1 +
∂Yt+1
∂Lt
)]
+ λFt ϕtmEt [qt+1] (31)
(1− ϕt)λFt = βEtλFt+1Rt (32)
ξt = λ
F
t ω¯
(1 + ϕt)
Φt
(33)
ξt = λ
F
t
[(
∂Yt
∂Nt
)
− wt
]
+ (1− s) βEt [ξt+1] (34)
where (30) is the condition associated to consumption, (33) the one on vacancy posting,
and (34) on employment51. Equation (31) is the one associated with land accumulation.
It implies that, in equilibrium, the value of current marginal utility of consumption needs
to equal the indirect value of utility deriving from land accumulation, i.e.: i) the value
of future consumption utility deriving from reselling land in the next period, βEtλFt+1qt+1;
ii) the future consumption utility arising from the product of land, βEtλFt+1
∂Yt+1
∂Lt
; iii) the
additional utility arising from current consumption related to the effect of land in loosening
the collateral constraint, ϕtmλFt Et [qt+1].
Equation (32) is a modified Euler equation. When the collateral constraint is not binding, ϕt
is equal to zero and we recover the standard Euler equation. When the debt limit is binding,
ϕt > 0 and ϕt = 1−β Etλ
F
t+1Rt
λFt
implying that firms’ marginal utility of current consumption is
greater than their discounted marginal utility of future consumption. Impatient firms choose
thus to increase consumption up to the limit imposed by (9).
51Note that, entrepreneurs are not risk neutral. With λFt = 1, we recover the canonical search model.
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Using equation (33) into equation (34) yields the job creation curve (equation (11) in section
3.3).
B.3 The wage curve
From the household’s intertemporal program, one gets:
VHt =
∂W(ΩHt )
∂Nt−1
=
∂W(ΩHt )
∂Nt
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
+ µEt
(
∂W(ΩHt+1)
∂Nt
)
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
= [Ut(C
n
t )− Ut(Cut + Γ) + λtwt − λtbt − λt (Cnt − Cut )]
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
+ µEt
(
∂W(ΩHt+1)
∂Nt
)
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
With Ut(Cnt ) = Ut(Cut + Γ), we have
VHt = [λtwt − λt(bt + Γ)]
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
+ µEt
(
∂W(ΩHt+1)
∂Nt
)
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
Where, from (26) ∂Nt
∂Nt−1
= (1− s) (1−Ψt), so that
VHt
λt
= (1− s) (1−Ψt)
[
wt − (bt + Γ) + µEt
(
1
λt
∂W(ΩHt+1)
∂Nt
)]
(35)
From the firms’ program VFt = ∂W(Ω
F
t )
∂Nt−1
= ξt (1− s) where ξt = λFt ω¯ (1+ϕt)Φt , thus:
∂W(ΩFt+1)
∂Nt
= (1− s) ω¯
Φt+1
λFt+1 (1 + ϕt+1)
VFt
λFt
= (1− s) ω¯
Φt
(1 + ϕt)
Then, using (11) we obtain:
VFt
λFt
= (1− s)
[
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt + βEt
(
1
λFt
∂W(ΩFt+1)
∂Nt
)]
Therefore, the surpluses are, respectively:
VFt
λFt
= (1− s)
[
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt + βEt
(
λFt+1
λFt
VFt+1
λFt+1
)]
(36)
VHt
λt
= (1− s) (1−Ψt)
[
wt − (bt + Γ) + µEt
(
λt+1
λt+1
VHt+1
λt
)]
(37)
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By maximizing the Nash product with respect to the wage, we obtain
(
VHt
λt
)
=
(
VFt
λFt
)
(1−)(1−Ψt)

.
By substituting for (36) and (37), and rewriting it, we obtain the wage curve (equation (12)
in section 3.4).
C Analysis of the simplified model
This Appendix analyzes the simplified model in section 4.
C.1 The responsiveness of labor market tightness to the business
cycle (θ′)
We examine here proposition 1. In order to derive θ′, we need to solve the labor market
equilibrium (ie. find θ), as the intersection of the job creation and the wage curve. We will
use the simplified version of the model described in section 4.
Let us denote Λ = %χ
ω
with % = 1/(1− β(1− s)). The job creation condition leads to
(noFF ) θ(y)1−ψ = Λ(y − w(θ(y), y))
(FF ) θ(y)1−ψ = Λ
y − w(θ(y), ϕ(y), y)
1 + ϕ(y)
where "noFF" refer to the standard DMP model and "FF" the DMP model with financial
frictions. In booms, access to credit is cheaper (ϕ falls), which increases the firm’s gain from
a filled vacancy. The wage setting rules are
(noFF ) w(θ(y), y) = (b+ Γ) + (1− ) (y + Σ(θ(y), y))
(FF ) w(θ(y), ϕ(y), y) = (b+ Γ) + (1− ) (y + Σ(θ(y), ϕ(y), y))
where outside search options are given by
(noFF ) Σ(θ(y), y) = (1− s)βωθ(y)
(FF ) Σ(θ(y), ϕ(y), y) = (1− s) β
1− ϕ(y)
(
−ω(1 + ϕ(y))
Φ(θ(y))
ϕ(y) + ω(1 + ϕ(y))θ(y)
)
Given that what matters for the firm at the time of hiring is the discounted sum of labor
costs, ie. w/(1 + ϕ(y)), labor market tightness is then a function of the discounted sum of
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outside search options, i.e.
Σ(θ(y), ϕ(y), y)
1 + ϕ(y)
= (1− s) β
1− ϕ(y)
(
− ω
Φ(θ(y))
ϕ(y) + ωθ(y)
)
,
Interestingly, with financial frictions there are two opposing forces incorporated into Σ/(1 +
ϕ): on the one hand, in booms, labor market tightness increases, which tends to raise
the opportunity cost of search activities (last term in Σ/(1 + ϕ) is common to all DMP
models); on the other hand, congestion externalities make recruitment longer in booms (1/Φ
increases), which lengthens the duration of the credit as hiring costs are financed through
loans. Because of impatience gaps, heterogenous valuations of future gains from the match
lead impatient entrepreneurs to be reluctant to accept higher wages (first term in Σ/(1+ϕ)).
Finally, we consider the ad hoc reduced form for financial frictions, ϕ(y) = 1 − β
µ
yζ . After
replacing the wage into the job creation conditions, we obtain
(noFF ) θ(y)1−ψ + Ωθ(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(θ(y))
= Υ(y − (b+ Γ))
(FF ) θ(y)1−ψ + Ωθ(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H(θ(y))
= Υ(y − (b+ Γ))∆(y)− Ω ϕ(y)
1− ϕ(y)θ(y)
(
1− 1
Ψ(θ(y))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=G(y,θ(y))
with Υ = Λ, Ω = Λ(1− )(1− s)βω and ∆(y) = 1
2−β
µ
yζ
.
The function ∆(y) can be interpreted as the credit multiplier for hiring decisions. It satisfies
∆′ =
ζ β
µ
yζ−1
(2−βµyζ)
2 and ∆′′ = ζ βµy
ζ−1
(
2− β
µ
yζ
)
(ζ−1)(2−βµyζ)+2ζyζ−1
(2−βµyζ)
4 , that implies, for y = 1 and
β ≈ µ (restrictions satisfied by our calibration), ∆′ → ζ and ∆′′ → ζ(3ζ − 1). Notice that if
ζ > 1/352, then ∆′′ > 0, i.e. the credit multiplier is convex.
Finally, the function G(y, θ(y)) measures the impact of labor market tightness on the credit
costs included in the wage equation. Given that Ψ(θ(y)) is the job finding rate, close to 0.4
(see Table 1), the term
(
1− 1
Ψ(θ(y))
)
is negative, so that
• in boom, G(y, θ) > 0 (as y > 1, then ϕ(y)
1−ϕ(y) < 0)
• in recession, G(y, θ) < 0 (as y < 1, then ϕ(y)
1−ϕ(y) > 0)
Given the definition of G, we have G′y(y, θ) = −ζ µβy−ζ−1
(
θ(y)− 1
χ
θ(y)1−ψ
)
and G′θ(y, θ) =(
µ
β
y−ζ − 1
)(
1− 1−ψ
χ
θ(y)−ψ
)
. For y = 1 and β ≈ µ, we deduce thatG′y(y, θ)→ −ζθ
(
1− 1
Ψ
)
>
52This is a relatively light restrictions and it is verified by our full fledged model
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0 and G′θ(y, θ)→ 0.
The responses of labor market tightness θ to aggregate productivity y are given by
θ′|noFF =
Υ
(1− ψ)θ(y)−ψ + Ω =
Υ
H ′(θ)
θ′|FF =
Υ[∆(y) + (y − (b+ Γ))∆′(y)]− ΩG′y(y, θ)
H ′(θ) + ΩG′θ(y, θ)
−→
y = 1,
β ≈ µ
Υ[1 + (y − (b+ Γ))ζ] + Ωζθ (1− 1
Ψ
)
H ′(θ)
If Υ(y − (b+ Γ))ζ + Ωζθ (1− 1
Ψ
)
> 0 then θ′|FF > θ′|noFF > 0.
Notice that this parameter restriction relates the impact of an additional borrowed dollar
(to finance hiring activities) to hiring incentives and their marginal cost. The parameter
restriction can be rewritten as Υy > Υ(b+ Γ) + Ωθ
(
1
Ψ
− 1). The term on the LHS captures
the incentives to create jobs, i.e., the discounted sum of marginal productivity. The RHS
summarizes the marginal costs of this hiring: i) those associated with the reservation wage
(b + Γ) and ii) those generated by search externalities on credit costs (θ
(
1
Ψ
− 1), which are
incorporatd in the wage bargaining). The parameter restriction suggests that the increase
of search externalities on credit costs must be lower than the increase of the discounted sum
of productivity net of the reservation wage, Υ(y − (b+ Γ)). Indeed, during booms the wage
increase must be limited such that hiring incentives remain large.
After simplifying this condition, we obtain
[
1− 1
%(1−)(1−s)β
]
< 2Ψ, which is always satisfied
by our range of parameters.
The case with rigid wages. In this particular case of the model, w = w. Labor market
tightness is determined only by hiring decisions given by the job creation conditions
(noFF ) θ(y)1−ψ = Λ(y − w)
(FF ) θ(y)1−ψ = Λ(y − w)∆(y)
implying, for y = 1 and β ≈ µ,
θ′|noFF =
Λ
(1− ψ)θ(y)−ψ =
Λ
1− ψθ(y)
ψ
θ′|FF = Λ
1 + (y − w)ζ
(1− ψ)θ(y)−ψ =
Λ
1− ψθ(y)
ψ[1 + ζ(y − w)]
We deduce that the result still holds: θ′|FF > θ′|noFF > 0 because ζ(y − w) > 0.
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C.2 The convexity vs. concavity of the labor market tightness (θ′′)
We examine here proposition 2. Given the expressions of θ′|FF and θ′|noFF , we deduce the
curvature of the hiring decision rules. Hence, we have
θ′′|noFF = −
Υ2H ′′(θ)
H ′(θ)3
> 0
θ′′|FF =
{ [
Υ(2∆′ + (y − (b+ Γ))∆′′)− Ω (G′yy +G′yθθ′)] (H ′ + ΩG′θ)
− (Υ[∆ + (y − (b+ Γ))∆′]− ΩG′y) [H ′′θ′ + Ω (G′θy +G′θθθ′)]
}
(H ′ + ΩG′θ)
2
Recall that H(θ(y)) = θ(y)1−ψ + Ωθ(y) so that H ′(θ) > 0 and H ′′(θ) < 0. As a result,
θ′′|noFF is always positive. The standard DMP model only exhibits θ-convexity.
With financial frictions, the sign of θ′′|FF is ambiguous. Given the definition of G, we have
G′′yy = ζ(ζ + 1)
µ
β
y−ζ−2
(
θ(y)− 1
χ
θ(y)1−ψ
)
→ ζ(ζ + 1)θ (1− 1
Ψ
)
< 0
G′′yθ = −ζ µβy−ζ−1
(
1− 1−ψ
χ
θ(y)−ψ
)
→ −ζ (1− 1−ψ
Ψ
)
> 0
G′′θy = −ζ µβy−ζ−1
(
1− 1−ψ
χ
θ(y)−ψ
)
→ −ζ (1− 1−ψ
Ψ
)
> 0
G′′θθ =
(
µ
β
y−ζ − 1
)
ψ 1−ψ
χ
θ(y)−ψ−1 → 0
Thus, we deduce that θ′′|FF can be approximated by
H ′θ′′ = Υ(2ζ + (y − (b+ Γ))ζ(3ζ − 1))− ΩG′yy︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
−θ′ (2ΩG′yθ +H ′′θ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+/−)
If 2ΩG′yθ +H ′′θ′ > 0, then we can have θ′′ < 0. The threshold value ζ˜ which guarantees that
this restriction holds is
ζ >
Υ
Ω
(
Ψ
χ
) 1
ψ
[(
1 + Ω
(1−ψ)χΨ
)
2
ψ
(
1−ψ
Ψ
− 1)+ ( 1
Ψ
− 1)]−Υ(y − (b+ Γ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ζ˜
If ζ > ζ˜, ie. when FF are large enough (credit cost ϕ is responsive enough to aggregate
shocks), then it is possible to have a θ-concavity.
The case with rigid wages. The endogenous mechanism entailing wage rigidity is the
main channel allowing us to have a θ-concavity in the model with FF. Therefore, introducing
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rigid wages into the model with FF can eliminate it. We explore here this point. The
expressions of θ′|FF and θ′|noFF in the case of rigid real wages read as:
θ′′|noFF = ψ
[
Λ
1− ψ
]2
θ2ψ−1
θ′′|FF = ψ
[
Λ
1− ψ
]2
θ2ψ−1(∆ + (y − w)∆′)2 + Λ
1− ψ [2∆
′ + (y − w)∆′′](1− ψ)θψ
Given that (∆+(y−w)∆′)→ (1+(y−w)ζ) > 1 when y → 1 and β ≈ µ, and (y−w)∆′′](1−
ψ)θψ > 0, we deduce that 0 < θ′′|noFF < θ′′|FF . This confirms our intuition. FF with rigid
wages are not consistent with θ-concavity. Interestingly, the model is characterized by more
θ-convexity than a standard DMP model. The large convexity of θ′′|FF suggests that rigid
real wages with FF can lead to welfare gains of cycles because they push up the average
labor market tightness above its steady-state value.
D Sensitivity analysis
D.1 Wage sluggishness
The wage sluggishness is such that
w˜t = γ˜w
Nash
t + (1− γ˜)w˜t−1
This wage is the relevant cost in the firm’s decisions. The steady state is not modified by
this new equation. The model is then simulated using the benchmark calibration.
D.2 Utility function
D.2.1 Greater Γ
We simulate the model with a greater value of Γ in our utility function (3). The value
of Γ is derived at the steady state by using the Nash bargained wage equation given i) the
calibrated level of unemployment benefits and ii) the bargaining power and wage (determined
at the steady state by the job creation curve). In order to increase Γ, we lower the level of
unemployment benefits from 0.7 to 0.5. The resulting value of Γ increases from 0.1848 in
the benchmark calibration to 0.3848. The volatility of technological shocks is adjusted to
44
match the volatility of output.
D.2.2 Alternative utility function
Wage bargaining now depends on intertemporal consumption-savings choices
We now demonstrate that with the alternative formulation of utility wage bargaining de-
pends on intertemporal consumption-savings choices. The wage determination is aimed at
maximizing the total surplus from the match, i.e.:
max
wt
St =
(VFt
λFt
)(VHt
λt
)1−
with St the total surplus of a match, VFt = ∂W(Ω
F
t )
∂Nt−1
the marginal value of a match for a
firm and VHt = ∂W(Ω
H
t )
∂Nt−1
the marginal household’s surplus from an established employment
relationship.  denotes the firm’s share of a job’s value, i.e., firms’ bargaining power.
Household
W(ΩHt ) = max
Ct
{
U(Ct)−NtΓ + µEtW(ΩHt+1)
}
subject to
Ct +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +Ntwt + (1−Nt)bt + Tt (38)
From the household’s intertemporal program, one gets:
VHt = [−Γ + λtwt − λtbt]
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
+ µEt
(
∂W(ΩHt+1)
∂Nt
)
∂Nt
∂Nt−1
Households labor supply evolves as follows:
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 + ΨtSt (39)
Each household knows that the evolution of S follows (2), so that (5) can be written as:
Nt = (1− s)Nt−1 + Ψt (1− (1− s)Nt−1) (40)
Where, from (40):
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∂Nt
∂Nt−1
= (1− s) (1−Ψt)
so that
VHt
λt
= (1− s) (1−Ψt)
[
− Γ
λt
+ (wt − bt) + µEt
(
λt+1
λt
VHt+1
λt+1
)]
(41)
hence
∂
(
VHt
λt
)
∂wt
= (1− s) (1−Ψt) (42)
Firm
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Vt,Nt,Bt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]} (43)
s.t.

−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − qt [Lt − Lt−1]− wtNt − ω¯Vt
+Yt (At, Lt−1, Nt) +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−Bt − ξV ω¯Vt +mEt [qt+1Lt] = 0 (λFt ϕt)
−Nt + (1− s)Nt−1 + ΦtVt = 0 (ξt)
given the initial conditions N0, B0, where ΩFt = {Nt−1,Ψt, wt, ht, bt, pit, Tt, Bt−1, Lt−1} is the
vector of variables taken as given by firms. The first order conditions associated to the firm’s
problem are:
U ′
(
CFt
)
= λFt (44)
λFt qt = βEt
[
λFt+1
(
qt+1 +
∂Yt+1
∂Lt
)]
+ λFt ϕtmEt [qt+1] (45)
(1− ϕt)λFt = βEtλFt+1Rt (46)
ξt = λ
F
t ω¯
(1 + ξV ϕt)
Φt
(47)
As a result,
VFt =
∂W(ΩFt )
∂Nt−1
= ξt (1− s)
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where
ξt = λ
F
t ω¯
(1 + ξV ϕt)
Φt
thus:
∂W(ΩFt+1)
∂Nt
= (1− s) ω¯
Φt+1
λFt+1 (1 + ξV ϕt+1)
and: VFt
λFt
= (1− s) ω¯
Φt
(1 + ξV ϕt)
we obtain:
VFt
λFt
= (1− s)
[
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt + βEt
(
λFt+1
λFt
VFt+1
λFt+1
)]
(48)
hence
∂
(
VFt
λFt
)
∂wt
= − (1− s)
Nash bargaining
max
wt
St =
(VFt
λFt
)(VHt
λt
)1−
The FOC is
(VHt
λt
)
=
(VFt
λFt
)
(1− ) (1−Ψt)

leading to

[
− Γ
λt
+ (wt − bt) + µEt
(
λt+1
λt
VHt+1
λt+1
)]
= (1− )
[
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt + βEt
(
λFt+1
λFt
VFt+1
λFt+1
)]
or
wt = 
(
bt +
Γ
λt
)
+ (1− ) ∂Yt
∂Nt
+ (1− ) (1− s) ω¯βEt
(
λFt+1
λFt
(1 + ϕt+1)
Φt+1
)
− (1− ) (1− s) ω¯µEt
(
λt+1
λt
(1−Ψt+1)
Φt+1
(1 + ϕt+1)
)
(49)
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Unlike equation (12), the Nash bargained wage, written at the steady state, depends on
intertemporal consumption-savings choices through λt in the first term, on the RHS.
D.2.3 Calibration.
The calibration is the same as in the benchmark case (Table 1) except that Γ is computed
at the steady state by using the Nash bargained wage equation and given i) the marginal
utility of consumption λ (determined at the steady state by consumption choices), ii) the
unemployment benefit replacement ratio (calibrated), iii) the wage (determined at the steady
state by the job creation curve condition) and iv) the bargaing power (calibrated).
D.2.4 Computing welfare.
The expected lifetime utility of a worker is
W˜w = E0
∞∑
t=0
µt [U (Ct)−NtΓ]
The welfare cost of fluctuations τ is such that
W˜w =
∞∑
t=0
µt
[
U
(
C¯(1− τ))− N¯Γ] = 1
1− µ
[
U
(
C¯(1− τ))− N¯Γ]
⇒ τ = 1−
[
[W˜w(1− µ) + N¯Γ](1− σ)
C¯1−σ
] 1
1−σ
We approximate welfare as
U (Ct)−NtΓ ≈ U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ
+U ′ (E0Ct) (Ct − E0Ct) + 1
2
U ′′ (E0Ct) (Ct − E0Ct)2
+Γ(Nt − E0Nt)
Contrary to the non-separable case, we have no covariance between C and N , and the
linearity with respect to N implies that the employment variance does not matter for the
48
welfare costs of fluctuations. What matters for the welfare is E0[U (Ct)−NtΓ], and thus
E0[U (Ct)−NtΓ] ≈ U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ + 1
2
U ′′ (E0Ct)E0[(Ct − E0Ct)2]
≈ U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ + 1
2
U ′′ (E0Ct) [E0Ct]2E0[(ĉt)2]
≈ (U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ)
{
1 +
1
2
U ′′ (E0Ct) [E0Ct]2
U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓE0[(ĉt)
2]
}
≈ (U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ)
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
where γΓ = E0NtΓU(E0Ct) < 0 when σ > 1. Using this approximation of the instantaneous utility
function, we deduce
W˜w ≈ 1
1− µ (U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ)
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
By using this last expression, we deduce that
U
(
C¯(1− τ))− N¯Γ = (U (E0Ct)− E0NtΓ){1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
U
(
C¯(1− τ)) = U (E0Ct){1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
− E0NtΓ
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
+ N¯Γ
U
(
C¯(1− τ))
U (E0Ct)
=
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
− γΓ
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
+
N¯
E0Nt
γΓ
U
(
C¯(1− τ))
U (E0Ct)
=
{
1− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
− γΓ
{
1− N¯
E0Nt
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
U
(
C¯(1− τ))
U (E0Ct)
=
{
1− γΓ + γΓ N¯E0Nt − (1− γΓ)
1
2
σ(1− σ)
1− γΓ V ar(ĉt)
}
U
(
C¯(1− τ))
U (E0Ct)
=
(
1 + γΓ
N¯ − E0Nt
E0Nt
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)V ar(ĉt)
)
⇒ 1− τ =
(
E0C
C¯
)(
1 + γΓ
N¯ − E0Nt
E0Nt
− 1
2
σ(1− σ)V ar(ĉt)
) 1
1−σ
D.3 Financial shocks
As in Liu et al. (2013) and Jermann & Quadrini (2012), the financial shock is captured as
a shock on m. This is interpreted as shocks on the tightness of the enforcement constraint
and, therefore, the borrowing capacity of the firm. The financial shock follows the stochastic
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process
log(mt) = (1− ρm)log(m) + ρmlog(mt−1) + mt
with the calibrated values from Liu et al. (2013)’s estimation results (ρm = 0.9804 and
σ
m
= 0.0112). The standard deviation of technological innovation σA is adjusted to match
the observed standard deviation of output. This calibration is used in column (2) Table 5.
D.4 Model with capital
Model with capital as collateral. In the model with capital households’ behaviorS do
not change. The introduction of capital alters the entrepreneurs’ problem. As in Liu et al.
(2013), the production function is now
Yt = At
[
LφtK
1−φ
t−1
]1−α
Nαt
with K the stock of capital. Capital accumulation is subject to adjustment costs such that
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It + Ω
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It
(
λKt
)
with It the investment flow and Ω the scale parameter on adjustment costs. The en-
trepreneur’s budget constraint is now
CFt +Rt−1Bt−1+q
k
t [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]+qt [Lt − Lt−1]+wtNt+ω¯Vt ≤ Yt+Bt+pit (λt) (50)
with λt the Lagrange multiplier on equation (50) and qkt the price of capital in consumption
units. The collateral constraint now includes capital
Bt + ωVt ≤ m
(
Et
[
qkt+1
]
Kt + Et [qt+1]Lt
)
(51)
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The firm’s program is
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Lt,Bt,Vt,Nt,Kt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]} (52)
s.t.

−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − qt [Lt − Lt−1]− wtNt − ω¯Vt
−qkt [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1] + Yt (At, Kt−1, Lt, Nt) +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−Bt − ω¯Vt +mEt
[
qkt+1
]
Kt +mEt [qt+1]Lt = 0 (λFt ϕt)
−Nt + (1− s)Nt−1 + ΦtVt = 0 (ξt)
−Kt + (1− δ)Kt−1 + It + Ω2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
It = 0 (λ
K
t )
Let us define the shadow price of capital in consumption units
qkt =
λKt
λFt
then the FOCs with respect to Kt is
qkt = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
(
(1− α) (1− φ) Yt+1
Kt
+ qkt+1 (1− δ)
)]
+ ϕtmEt
[
qkt+1
]
and the choice of investment is such that
1 = qkt
[
1− Ω
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− It
It−1
Ω
(
It
It−1
− 1
)]
+ βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
qkt+1Ω
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2]
Calibration. The capital adjustment cost parameter Ω = 0.1881 and φ = 0.0695 are set
to the estimated values found in Liu et al. (2013). δ = 0.025 as in Liu et al. (2013). α = 0.805
is set so as to mimic the capital-output ratio (4.15 in the US data, as reported in Liu et al.
(2013)). m = 0.123 is chosen to match the benchmark value of B/Y = 0.59. Finally, the
standard deviation of technological innovation σA is adjusted to match the observed standard
deviation of output. This calibration is used in columns (3) and (5) of Table 5.
D.5 Model with capital as collateral with wage and investment
costs in the financial constraint
Model. The behaviors of the households do not change. As in Millard et al. (2017),
we introduce wage payment and investment cost in the borrowing constraint. The financial
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constraint becomes
Bt + ωVt + wtNt + It ≤ m
(
Et
[
qkt+1
]
Kt + Et [qt+1]Lt
)
(53)
The firm’s program is
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Lt,Bt,Vt,Nt,Kt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]} (54)
s.t.

−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − qkt [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]− qt [Lt − Lt−1]− wtNt − ω¯Vt
+Yt (At,Kt−1, Lt, Nt) +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−qkt [Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1]−Bt − ω¯Vt − wtNt +mEt
[
qkt+1
]
Kt +mEt [qt+1]Lt = 0 (λ
F
t ϕt)
−Nt + (1− s)Nt−1 + ΦtVt = 0 (ξt)
Nt : λ
F
t
(
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt − ϕtwt
)
+ βEtξt+1(1− s) = ξt
Vt :
λFt (ω¯ + ω¯ϕt)
Φt
= ξtso that
Et
λFt+1 (ω¯ + ω¯ϕt+1)
Φt+1
= Etξt+1
We then get the job creation condition
ω¯
(1 + ϕt)
Φt
=
∂Yt
∂Nt
− wt (1 + ϕt) + (1− s)β ω¯
λFt
Et
[
λFt+1
(1 + ϕt+1)
Φt+1
]
FOCs with respect to Kt Let us define the shadow price of capital in consumption units
qkt =
λKt
λFt
. The FOC is
qkt (1 + ϕt) = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
(
(1− α) (1− φ) Yt+1
Kt
+ qkt+1 (1− δ)
)]
+ ϕtmEt
[
qkt+1
]
(55)
Without financial frictions, ϕt = 0, we recover the usual FOC on capital.
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FOCs with respect to It
(1 + ϕt) = q
k
t
[
1− Ω
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− It
It−1
Ω
(
It
It−1
− 1
)]
+βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
qkt+1Ω
(
It+1
It
− 1
)(
It+1
It
)2]
(56)
Without financial frictions, ϕt = 0, we recover the usual FOC on investment.
Calibration. We consider the same calibration as in section D.4, except for m = 0.28
that is adjusted to match the benchmark value of B/Y = 0.59. α = 0.81 is set so as to
mimic the capital-output ratio (4.15 in the US data, as reported in Liu et al. (2013)). The
standard deviation of technological innovation σA is adjusted to match the observed standard
deviation of output. This calibration is used in column (4) of Table 5.
Table 5: Business-cycle volatility : Models versus data
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Data Benchmark Financial Capital Financial
shocks shocks
and capital
σA 0.0031 0.0024 0.0066 0.0067
std(.) std(.) std(.) std(.) std(.)
Y 1.44 ** 1.44 ** 1.44 ** 1.44 ** 1.44 **
C 0.81 * 0.88 * 0.85 * 0.80 * 0.82 *
N 0.72 * 0.74 * 0.86 * 0.65 * 0.65 *
Y/N 0.54 * 0.28 * 0.21 * 0.52 * 0.52 *
w 0.62 * 0.49 * 0.50 * 0.35 * 0.36 *
U 7.90 * 5.45 * 6.30 * 4.81 * 4.80 *
Ψ 5.46 * 6.26 * 7.50 * 12.2 * 12.5 *
V 9.96 * 12.7 * 15.5 * 24.1 * 24.5 *
B 1.68 * 1.35 * 1.63 * 0.27 * 1.03 *
q 3.21 * 2.59 * 2.83 * 0.53 * 0.89 *
I 4.59 * * * 2.52 * 2.96 *
corr(U,Ψ) -0.91 -0.86 -0.86 -0.54 -0.54
corr(U, V ) -0.97 -0.71 -0.72 -0.40 -0.39
** std (in percentage); * relative to GDP std
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E Understanding the welfare effect of financial shocks
using Mickey Mouse models
In this section, we show in Mickey Mouse models that financial shocks do decrease welfare
costs of fluctuations in a model with land only (section E.1). This provides a rationale for the
quantitative results found in column (5) in Table 4. In contrast, financial shocks do increase
business-cycle costs in a model with capital (section E.2), which explains the quantitative
results found in column (7) in Table 4.
E.1 A simple model with land : Financial shocks reduce welfare
costs
E.1.1 Household
The dynamic problem of a typical household can be written as follows
W(ΩHt ) = max
Ct,Bt
{
U(Ct) + µEtW(ΩHt+1)
}
s.c. Ct +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + wt
given the initial conditions on state variables B0 and ΩHt = {wt, Bt−1}, the vector of variables
taken as given by households. Let λt be the shadow price of the budget constraint. The
FOC are (Ct)
−σ = λt and −λt + µEt [Rtλt+1] = 0. The labor supply is Nt = 1.
E.1.2 Entrepreneur
The firm’s program is
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Lt,Bt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]}
s.t.
{
−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − qt [Lt − Lt−1]− wtNt + Yt (At, Lt−1, Nt) +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−Bt +mtEt [qt+1Lt] = 0 (λFt ϕt)
given the initial conditions B0, where ΩFt = {wt, Bt−1, Lt−1,mt} is the vector of variables
taken as given by firms. Letting λFt and λFt ϕt be the Lagrange multipliers associated to each
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constraint, the first order conditions of problem read:
U ′
(
CFt
)
= λFt
λFt qt = βEt
[
λFt+1
(
qt+1 +
∂Yt+1
∂Lt
)]
+ λFt ϕtmtEt [qt+1]
(1− ϕt)λFt = βEtλFt+1Rt
wt =
∂Yt
∂Nt
E.1.3 Equilibrium
Given that Nt = 1 and Lt = 1 ∀t and assuming that Yt = AtL1−αt Nαt = At, we deduce
Dynamic system Steady state
1 = µEt
[
λt+1
λt
]
Rt 1 = µR
qt = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
(qt+1 + (1− α)At+1)
]
+ ϕtmtEt [qt+1] q = β(1−α)1−β−ϕmA
1 = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
]
Rt + ϕt 1 =
β
µ
+ ϕ
wt = αAt w = αA
Ct +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + wt C =
1−µ
µ
B + αA
At +Bt = C
F
t +Rt−1Bt−1 + wt C
F = (1− α)A− 1−µ
µ
B
Bt = mtEt [qt+1] B = mq
How does B change with m? This depends on mq = mβ(1−α)
1−β−ϕmA ≡ F (m,A). We have
F ′m =
β(1−α)(1−β)
(1−β−ϕm)2 > 0 whereas F
′′
mm =
2ϕβ(1−α)(1−β)
(1−β−ϕm)3 > 0. Hence, mq is convex implying that
E[mq] > mq. Thus, expected debt is larger than steady-state debt: E[B] > B. Given the
worker’s budget constraint (C = 1−µ
µ
B+αA), we have E[C] > C and expected consumption
is larger than steady-state consumption. The level effect on consumption actually implies
that financial shocks in an economy with land are actually welfare-improving. Uncertainty
generates a premium on the price of land as its return is risky for the bank. In this case, the
value of worker’s wealth increases on average, which explains the larger consumption in the
stochastic economy, with respect to the stabilized economy.
How does B change with A? Given that F is linear in A, we deduce that E[mq] = mq,
hence E[B] = B and thus E[C] = C. Technological shocks are neutral on the level effect of
the welfare costs of the business cycle. This last result shows that welfare costs provided by
our benchmark model are the result of the interaction between labor market and financial
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frictions. Indeed, without labor market frictions, the technological shocks are not costly in
an economy with only financial constraints.
E.2 A simple model with capital : Financial shocks increase welfare
costs
E.2.1 Individual behaviors
The household’s program does not change. The firm’s program becomes
W(ΩFt ) = max
CFt ,Bt,Kt
{
U
(
CFt
)
+ βEt
[W(ΩFt+1)]}
s.t.
{
−CFt −Rt−1Bt−1 − wtNt −Kt + AtK1−αt−1 Nαt +Bt = 0 (λFt )
−Bt +mtKt = 0 (λFt ϕt)
The FOCs are
U ′
(
CFt
)
= λFt
λFt = βEt
[
λFt+1
∂Yt+1
∂Kt
]
+ λFt ϕtmt
(1− ϕt)λFt = βEtλFt+1Rt
wt =
∂Yt
∂Nt
E.2.2 Equilibrium
Given that Nt = 1 ∀t, we deduce
Dynamic system Steady state
1 = µEt
[
λt+1
λt
]
Rt 1 = µR
1 = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
(1− α)At+1K−αt
]
+ ϕtmt K =
(
β(1−α)
1−ϕm A
) 1
α
1 = βEt
[
λFt+1
λFt
]
Rt + ϕt 1 =
β
µ
+ ϕ
wt = αAtK
1−α
t w = αAK
1−α
Ct +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + wt C =
1−µ
µ
B + αAK1−α
AtK
1−α
t−1 +Bt = C
F
t +Rt−1Bt−1 +Kt + wt C
F = (1− α)AK1−α − 1−µ
µ
B −K
Bt = mtKt B = mK
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The steady state, conditional to {A,m}, gives K = K(m,A) = (β(1−α)A) 1α (1−ϕm)− 1α and
B = B(m,A) = mK(m,A). Assume a first restriction, which is satisfied in our calibration
exercises, namely CF ≈ 0 ie. 1−µ
µ
B ≈ (1− α)AK1−α −K. We deduce that consumption C
is given by C ≈ AK(m,A)1−α −K(m,A),
with
{
K′m(m,A) = 1α ϕ1−ϕmK(m,A) > 0
K′′mm(m,A) = 1+αα ϕ1−ϕmK′m(m,A) > 0
This leads to
C ′′ = K′m(m,A) ϕ1−ϕm 1α [(1− α)AK(m,A)−α − (1 + α)]
Given that K′m(m,A) ϕ1−ϕm 1α > 0, C ′′ has the same sign as the term between brackets, which
consists of 2 terms. The first term (1− α)AK(m,A)−α < 1 because it represents an interest
rate, and the second term 1 + α > 1. This implies that C ′′ < 0, hence E[C] < C when the
uncertainty comes from financial shocks. This shows that fluctuations in m reduce welfare.
Why do changes in m increase welfare costs when the collateral includes capital?
In presence of financial shocks, the return on the collateral becomes risky for banks. This
uncertainty generates a premium on the borrowing constraint (an over-accumulation). This
generates a new motive to increase leveraging (B increases in the volatile economy relative
to the stabilized economy) and thus, capital. As capital in our economy is characterized by
decreasing returns to scale, this over-accumulation is then costly in terms of consumption.
F Asymmetric welfare costs of business cycles
F.1 Benchmark
As stressed by Hairault et al. (2010), Jung & Kuester (2011) and Petrosky-Nadeau & Zhang
(2017), search and matching models feature asymmetric responses to business-cycle shocks;
recessions (expansions) are characterized by severe and rapid rises (gradual decline) in unem-
ployment. These asymmetric fluctuations are supported by empirical evidence.53 The IRFs
in model B (without financial frictions) are consistent with these features. Figure 2, panel
(b), displays the employment response to the calibrated positive productivity shock when
53See e.g. MacKay & Reis (2008) and Petrosky-Nadeau & Zhang (2017), Ferraro (2018) or Adjemian et al.
(2016).
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the economy is in boom – i.e., starting from a point where the economy is already hit by the
same shock (dotted line)– and to a negative shock of the same magnitude when the economy
is in recession (solid line). Employment falls more in a recession than it increases in a boom.
Figure 2, panel (a), shows the IRFs from model A (with financial frictions) in a recession
versus economic boom. The asymmetric response of employment is even larger than in model
B. In order to measure this increased asymmetry due to the presence of financial frictions,
we report, in panel (c), the gaps between IRFs in recession versus boom in both models.
The gap between IRFs is twice as large in the economy with financial frictions (model A)
as in the economy without financial frictions (model B); the maximum gap is around 15%
in model A, but only 7.5% in model B.54. In addition, since labor market adjustments are
connected to credit market conditions, the immediate response of credit market conditions
directly affect employment dynamics. The maximum gap is reached after two quarters in
model A and seven quarters in model B.
In order to measure the implied business-cycle costs of these non-linearities, we compute
the time-varying welfare cost τ as in Petrosky-Nadeau & Zhang (2017) for model A (with
financial frictions) and model B (without financial frictions).55 Figure 2, panel (d), plots
the welfare cost τ × 100 against the technological shock. First, in model B, the welfare
cost is countercyclical. In addition, welfare gains in expansion are much lower than welfare
costs in recession, which is consistent with the asymmetric responses to business-cycle shocks
displayed in matching models. Starting from point B1, a 10% increase in productivity (from
1 to 1.1) results in a welfare gain of 2% while, for a fall in productivity of the same magnitude
(from 1 to 0.9), the welfare loss is twice as large. Interestingly, welfare costs in model A are all
located above the corresponding costs for model B, suggesting that the presence of financial
frictions moves the economy to regions with higher unemployment levels and therefore higher
welfare costs. Furthermore, since the welfare cost function shifts upwards, the business cycle
starts being desirable (τ < 0) only for large expansions (for a technological change of at least
1.15, beyond point A1 in Figure 2). Even in the case of large expansions, the slope of the
welfare cost function is nearly flat; welfare gains remain very small. In that sense, we argue
that the presence of financial frictions makes the welfare costs more asymmetric than in the
matching model. To illustrate this point, we report, in panel (d) of Figure 2, the welfare
54This last case summarizes the results reported in Hairault et al. (2010), Jung & Kuester (2011) and
Petrosky-Nadeau & Zhang (2017).
55The welfare cost at each date is based on a comparison between the deterministic worker’s welfare and
the fluctuating worker’s welfare summarized by his value function. This value function is time-varying. Its
expected value is computed, for each current state of the economy, using the second-order Dynare approx-
imation of endogenous variables (see Adjemian et al. (2014)). We consider the decision rules around the
mean, rather than the steady state, which is the default setting in Dynare
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Figure 2: The Welfare cost of business cycles and asymmetry: Why do financial frictions
matter?
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Model A. With Fin. Fric.
Model B. No Fin. Fric.
Model A. With Fin. Fric. with τ<0
(a): IRF of Employment ×100, N in response to a positive productivity shock starting from expansion (dotted line) and −N in response to a
negative productivity shock starting from recession (solid line) in model A with financial frictions. The size of the shock is calibrated as above.
(b): IRF of Employment ×100, N in response to a positive productivity shock starting from expansion (dotted line) and −N in response to a
negative productivity shock starting from recession (solid line) in model B without financial frictions. The size of the shock is calibrated as above.
(c) :
−IRFrecession−IRFexpansion
IRFexpansion
× 100 in models A (solid line) and B (dotted line). (d) The steady-state value of technological shock is 1.
Curves are quadratic fit over 30,000 simulations for model A (circle)and model B (solid line). + : segment of cost function for model A (only
segment with τ < 0, beyond point A1) s hifted to point B1.
cost function of model A (just the segment beyond point A1, with τ < 0) at point B1. It can
then be easily seen that, when both models predict welfare gains (expansions), welfare gains
remain small in model A, with financial frictions, while they increase quasi-linearly without
financial frictions in model B.
F.2 Robustness
Figure 3 also shows that the asymmetries intrinsic to our model are not affected by the intro-
duction of an additional shock. Indeed, the structure of our framework remains unaffected.
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Figure 3: The Welfare cost of business cycles and asymmetry
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The steady-state value of technological shock is 1. Curves are quadratic fit over 30,000 simulations for each model.
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